Board Gender Diversity and the Underpricing and Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings : Evidence from Finland by Tammi, Werner
Werner Tammi 
Board Gender Diversity and the Underpricing and 
Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings 







School of Finance 
 Master’s Thesis in Finance  
Master’s Degree Programme in Finance 
 
1 
UNIVERSITY OF VAASA 
School of Finance 
Author: Werner Tammi 
Title of the Thesis: Board Gender Diversity and the Underpricing and Long-Run Per-
formance of Initial Public Offerings: Evidence from Finland 
Degree: Master of Science in Economics and Business Administration 
Programme: Master’s Degree Programme in Finance 
Supervisor: Sami Vähämaa 
Year: 2021 Pages: 81 
ABSTRACT: 
Initial Public Offering (IPO) is a process where a private company wants to get publicly listed and 
sells its stocks to the public for the first time. IPOs have attracted many finance professionals, 
such as researchers and investors, during the last few decades. The attraction towards IPOs has 
been focusing on both, long- and short-run performances of IPOs. The purpose of this thesis was 
to study whether board gender diversity affects the Finnish IPO performance. Both short-term 
and long-term performances of the IPOs were examined. The first empirically motivated hypoth-
esis stated that the greater female board presence reduces the underpricing of the IPO. The 
second hypothesis was about the long-term performance, claiming that IPOs with greater fe-
male board presence outperform the IPOs with lower female board presence in a one-year pe-
riod. The data sample consisted of 45 IPOs that were divided into two groups, depending on 
whether the companies had women sitting on the board during the listing process or not. All 
IPOs in the sample occurred between 2013 and 2018 in the Nasdaq Helsinki. The short-run per-
formance was examined with 1st-day market-adjusted returns. The long-term performance was 
studied with 12-month returns, using market- and risk-adjusted methods. In a market-adjusted 
framework, results were calculated using data with 1st-day returns included and excluded. The 
risk factors considered in the empirical part were size and beta. OMX Helsinki Cap was used as 
the market benchmark, and 3-month Euribor was used as a risk-free rate. Regarding the first 
hypothesis, the results show that even though the mean and median underpricing was some-
what smaller for IPOs with a diverse board, the connection found was only a weak tendency. 
There is no statistical significance in the difference. However, the empirical studies revealed that 
Finnish markets' underpricing had impaired quite largely during the last decades. While observ-
ing the long-term performance, the IPOs with gender-diverse boards earned higher and even 
statistically significant alphas compared to its counterpart. However, the difference between 
the groups is relatively small, meaning that there is no statistical significance. Interestingly, the 
Finnish IPOs from the sample performed quite much better than expected from the previous 
studies, meaning that the long-term performance was better than expected. Even though the 
hypotheses needed to be rejected due to the lack of statistical evidence, this thesis offers excel-
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Initial Public Offering (IPO) is a process where a private company wants to get publicly 
listed and sells its stocks to the public for the first time. After the IPO procedure, the 
company’s stock trades in a selected market, such as in Nasdaq. From the market, indi-
vidual investors are able to either buy or sell the company’s stock. After the listing, the 
company is subject to regulatory, legal, and disclosure requirements, leading to better 
corporate governance. A typical IPO company is a small and young business seeking cap-
ital to expand. Alternatively, IPOs can also be issued by larger privatively owned compa-
nies seeking to increase their capital and become publicly traded firms. 
 
IPO performances have been one of the most attractive niches of finance among re-
searchers during the last few decades. The studies have been focusing on both, long- 
and short-run performances of IPOs. Based on these studies, three individual anomalies 
have gained a foothold and recognition in finance. First, and probably the most known, 
is the IPO underpricing, which states that IPOs tend to be underpriced in their listing 
price (Ritter, 1991). Usually, these IPOs create abnormal returns during the first trading 
day.  The second phenomenon, the long-run underperformance of IPOs, focuses on the 
reasons behind the relatively weak long-term (1year – 5 year) performance of IPOs (Rit-
ter, 1991). The last anomaly is called the hot issue markets, which claims that during 
periods with high listing activities, the IPOs tend to be significantly underpriced (Ibbot-
son, 1975). These anomalies will be discussed in more detail later in this thesis.  
 
Another widely researched topic during the last few decades that has a crucial role in 
this paper is gender representation on corporate boards of directors or board gender 
diversity. It refers to the proportion of men and women that sits on the company’s board. 
In 2012, the EU started to take action against the unequal representation of men and 
women on the board. The solution to this is the gender quota suggesting every EU coun-
try to have at least 40% of women sit in listed companies’ boards (European Commission, 
2012). This suggestion has sparked a debate whether the board gender diversity is just 
a social dilemma or has any economic effect.  
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The impact of board gender diversity on a company’s performance has been studied 
from many different perspectives. Most of the studies have focused on the risk and per-
formance differentials of companies with different board diversity. This thesis will focus 
on the anomalies presented above, especially on the first two, using data from Finnish 
IPOs. The purpose of this thesis is to link these phenomena to the IPO companies' board 
gender diversity. In short, the idea is to study whether the IPO companies’ board’s gen-
der structure affects its short- and long-term performance.  
 
 
1.1 Purpose of the Study 
This thesis aims to research the relation between Finnish IPOs performances between 
2013 and 2018 and the IPO companies' board gender diversity. Classification into differ-
ent groups regarding the board gender diversity is made by dividing all IPOs into two 
groups. The first one consists of IPO companies having at least one woman sitting on the 
board during the listing process, and the second group includes all other companies that 
have no women on the board. More precisely, the object is to examine both short- and 
long-term performance. For the short-term, the first-day return horizon is used. For 
more extended performance, a one-year period is used. The short-run performance is 
tested market-adjusted framework. The long-run performance is examined with both 
market- and risk-adjusted returns. In addition to the two groups, the third group consist-
ing of all IPOs is investigated too.  
 
This study makes a few contributions to the existing literature relating to IPO perfor-
mances. First, this seems to be the first paper studying the relation between IPO perfor-
mances and IPO companies’ board gender diversity in Finnish markets. Besides, this 
study offers a bit controversial results of IPO underpricing and long-term IPO underper-
formance from Finnish markets. When it comes to the controversial results, the most 
remarkable findings are the shrunken underpricing and moderate long-term 
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performance. The differences and reasons behind them are addressed and described 
more precisely later in this thesis.  
 
This thesis offers excellent value for both researchers and investors. Even though the 
small sample size creates its own problems regarding the results, the findings can be 
helpful and cause further research or new hypotheses. First, researchers worldwide 
might find the motivation to create a similar study using different time-period or differ-
ent markets. Also, the empirical part can be extended in many ways if it is wanted. Sec-
ond, financial professionals and small investors are provided with empirical results of the 
behavior of Finnish IPOs, offering them a piece of extraordinary evidence to rely on when 
making investment decisions.  
 
 
1.2 Hypotheses of the Study 
The previous literature shows that IPOs, on average, are significantly underpriced. In the 
U.S markets, Ritter (1991) and Purnanandam et al. (2004) report high first-day returns 
over few decades. Scandinavian and Finnish markets have been studied way less, yet 
there are similar findings regarding the underpricing. Keloharju (1993) observes Finnish 
IPOs and his results show that IPOs in Finland tend to increase in price during the first 
trading day. In addition, Westerholm’s (2006) study offers similar results with clear un-
derpricing in Scandinavian markets. In fact, Westerholm’s study shows that the under-
pricing has even increased from the 80s to the 00s. Hahl et al. (2014) examine the per-
formance of Finnish IPOs between 1994 and 2006, focusing on the comparison between 
value and growth IPOs. Their results offer great evidence on the underpricing of Finnish 
IPOs. 
 
The underpricing of IPOs has been widely studied and recognized, yet the different IPO 
subcategories’ affection has gained less attention. While certain IPO-groups behavior, 
such as low and high B/M-IPOs and low and high P/V-IPOs have been acknowledged, the 
relation between board gender structure and IPO performance is virtually unexplored. 
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However, few studies regarding the relation have been published, mostly from emerging 
markets. Handa and Singh (2015) studied the relation in Indian markets, finding no evi-
dence that women on the board affect the possible underpricing. Kaur and Singh (2015) 
found a negative relation between gender diversity on the board and IPO underpricing. 
As the number of women on the board increases, the underpricing of IPO decreases. 
However, the results are not statistically significant. Reutzel and Belsito (2015) explore 
how IPO investors view female presence on boards of directors in the United States. 
Their study suggests that US IPO investors react negatively to the female presence on 
the board of directors. As many previous studies focus on Indian markets, it is important 
to address the cultural differences in India and Finland. The role of women in Finnish 
culture and business is a lot better compared to India. Therefore, it can be assumed that 
a woman's role is much more appreciated and vital in Finland. Consequently, a woman 
can be believed to be a stronger “quality signal” in Finland than in emerging markets.  
These factors motivate the first hypothesis, which in this study is: 
  
H1: The greater female board presence reduces the underpricing of the IPO. 
 
As the previous literature regarding IPOs shows, the underpricing of IPOs is not the only 
unique characteristic. In addition to underpricing, the long-term underperformance of 
IPOs is a widely accepted phenomenon. Purnanandam et al. (2004) provide results with 
statistically significant long-term underperformance of U.S IPOs. Keloharju (1993), 
Westerholm (2006), and Hahl et al. (2014) offer similar results from Finnish markets. As 
with underpricing, the relation between board gender diversity and long-term IPO un-
derperformance has not gained much attention. However, few papers have studied the 
relationship. Welbourne et al. (2007) show in their study from U.S markets that in the 
long-term, having women on the board results in higher earnings and greater share-
holder wealth compared to a situation where there are no women on the board. 
McGuiness’s (2018) results from Hong Kong’s markets are in line with Welbourne et al., 
suggesting that women sitting on the board affects positively to IPO company’s long-
term performance. However, this is not studied in either European or Finnish markets. 
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Based on the clear evidence from other markets and lack of study in Finnish markets, 
the second testable hypothesis can be formed: 
 
H2: IPOs with greater female board presence outperform the IPOs with lower female 
board presence in a one-year period. 
 
Altogether, the two hypotheses claim that there is a converse relationship between long-
term and short-term performance. In almost all IPO-related papers, this negative con-
nection has been recognized. These hypotheses are formed from a company’s point of 
view, as from an investor’s point of view, the higher underpricing is seen as a good thing 
due to its ability to create higher excess returns. 
 
 
1.3 Structure of the study  
This thesis consists of a theoretical and empirical part. In this first chapter, a quick intro-
duction to the topic and objective of the study is given. The second chapter begins the 
empirical part, as it introduces the Initial Public Offering and its Finnish characteristics. 
The third chapter is all about the determinants of stock prices. Classic theories and val-
uation models, such as Modern Portfolio Theory, Capital Market Efficiency and Capital 
Asset Pricing Models, are reviewed. The fourth chapter continues building the theoreti-
cal part, describing the most known IPO anomalies and theories explaining them. The 
fifth chapter ends the theoretical part with a cross-section to the theoretical part of the 
board of directors and gender diversity’s effect on the business’s performance. Different 
theories around gender diversity are discussed too.  
 
The sixth chapter begins the empirical part of this thesis. First, data used in this study is 
reviewed, and the IPO categorization is explained. Following that, this paper's method-
ology is described, explaining both market- and risk-adjusted methods. To conclude the 
sixth chapter, the limitations of the study are listed. The seventh chapter is about the 
empirical results of the study. The chapter starts with descriptive statistics. After that, 
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both short- and long-run performances of the sample IPOs are reviewed, and the results 
are explained open with possible statistical effects. The last chapter, conclusions, con-
cludes the study as the name implies. The empirical results are stapled together, the 
results’ contributions to the existing literature are explained, and further research pos-
sibilities based on this study are motivated.  
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2 Initial Public Offerings 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the fundamentals of Initial Public Offerings 
and explain how they work. First, the basics about Initial Public Offerings are explained, 
including reasons why firms go public. Secondly, the fundamentals of Finnish companies 
going public will be walked through since Initial Public Offerings have many country-spe-
cific details that affect both motives and consequences of Initial Public Offerings. Initial 
Public Offering is often abbreviated to IPO, and the latter will be used during this thesis 
in order to simplify the sentences.  
 
 
2.1 The Fundamentals of Initial Public Offerings  
Going public is a significant entity around most companies at some point in their life. The 
going public might help expand the business’s size and take it to the next level. On the 
other hand, it may affect the company’s business negatively and cause harm. The pro-
cess of going public is considered to be a natural part of a company’s growth. However, 
it is not always necessary, and business can do enormously well without being a public 
company. In the Initial Public Offering, the company going public offers its stocks for in-
vestors to buy. Going public, for example, helps the company to raise capital and makes 
valuation more transparent. For investors, the IPOs are an excellent opportunity to invest 
among the firsts and benefit from the company’s stock’s possible undervalue that has 
gone public. In addition to the investor and the issuing company, the underwriter is the 
third key party of the IPO-process. IPO underwriters are specialists, usually investment 
banks & bankers, whose job is to work closely with the issuing company to determine 
the Initial Offering price and market it. (Bodie et al., 2006) 
 
To go a bit deeper into the IPOs, the motives behind going public need to be considered. 
The motives why companies go public differ because of segment and location, but in 
most cases, firms go public in order to raise equity capital. A company seeking growth 
might need capital to expand its businesses, increase R&D, or invest in marketing. Non-
16 
financial reasons, such as increased publicity, usually play a minimal role in firms’ “going 
public”-strategies (Ritter & Welch, 2002). 
 
 
2.2 The Listing Process 
The firms’ IPO listing processes have their own characteristics based on the market 
where they are going public. This chapter will focus on Nordic countries’ listing process, 
as they all share the same characteristics. The listing process is generally started at least 
six months before the actual listing happens, and it is usually a very laborious period. 
The underwriter, also called book runner or book manager, is often selected at this stage 
at the latest. In more significant listings, it is typical that the issuing company selects few 
underwriters, which forms an entity called a syndicate. The average amount of under-
writers per IPO has been growing during the last decades. Before the 1990s, the IPOs 
usually had just one underwriter, but from 2010 to 2018, the average has risen to 6,5 
underwriters per listing process (Ritter, 2019). Each IPO has one leading underwriter, 
which may suggest possible co-underwriter & co-managers based on different motives.  
 
When a company considers applying to listen in Helsinki, a meeting with Nasdaq Helsinki 
needs to be arranged to discuss the listing details. The listing’s final application needs to 
be done at least a week before the Listing Committee meeting. Listing of the shares is 
decided by the same committee reporting to Nasdaq Helsinki’s Board of Directors. To 
pass the application, the listing company needs to present itself and its business to the 
committee. In the second meeting, the listing company offers a written report to the 
committee, which includes an agreement on exchanging the shares. In addition to that, 
the latest balance sheet and income statement need to be delivered. (OMX Nordic Ex-
change, 2008b) 
 
Most IPOs include a lock-up agreement, which is conducted for several reasons. The lock-
up agreement prevents the pre-IPO shareholders from selling their shares during the 
first 180/365 days after listing, which is called the lock-up period. The lock-up 
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agreement’s main motive is to ensure that no new shares are coming to the early after-
market. Secondly, it gives the underwriter time to deliver the securities. Third, the lock-
up agreement makes sure that employees are committed to the company for the up-
coming six or twelve months. (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2003) 
 
On the other hand, such a deal attempts to stabilize a freshly issued stock’s early price 
development. With a lock-up deal, the investors can be sure that no new shares will be 
delivered to the early aftermarket (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2003). The next big deci-
sion for the company is choosing the contract type. Usually, firms end up doing either a 
firm commitment contract or the best efforts contract. In a firm commitment underwrit-
ing, the underwriter, or a syndicate, guarantees to buy all shares offered to the sale and 
then markets and tries to resale them to the investors. The underwriter bears the risk of 
the possible unsold shares, so the deal’s commission is higher. In other words, it is more 
expensive but riskless for the issuing firm. In a best efforts contract, the underwriter does 
their best in marketing the shares so that all of them get sold. The firm commitment 
contract's main difference is that the issuing company keeps the risk and suffers finan-
cially if some shares remain unsold. The underwriter is not obligated to purchase the 
shares. Logically, this agreement type is cheaper but riskier for the issuing company.  
 
 
2.3 IPO Valuation 
Valuation is one of the main challenges in the listing process. It is a very dynamic process, 
and the valuation gets more accurate regularly during the listing process. The valuation 
process can be divided into three different phases. The first phase is called the prepara-
tion phase. The leading underwriter produces a preliminary valuation range based on 
the discussions between them and the issuing company. During the second phase, the 
premarketing phase, valuation is amplified based on possible investors’ feedback. The 
premarketing discussions are held between underwriters, analysts, and the issuing com-
pany. The third and last phase is the actual equity issuance. The subscription price is set, 
and it is either exact or a price range. The final price is determined based on the demand 
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on the so-called book-building process if the price range-method is used instead of an 
exact price. (Pörssisäätiö, 2006) 
 
The most used methods in valuations while working with IPOs in Finland are described 
below. They can be categorized into three different categories. The first one is a bench-
mark firm analysis, where the valuation is done by comparing the issuing company’s fi-
nancial figures to benchmark companies’ figures that trade publicly. The most common 
ratios used in this kind of valuation are EV/Revenue, EV/EBITDA, EV/EBIT, and P/E. The 
second category produces the valuations based on completed Initial Public Offerings. 
These already listed companies’ multiples are analyzed and amplified if necessary, based 
on their share price development. The most used ratios in valuation in this category are 
EV/Revenue, EV/EBIT, and EV/EBITDA. The last category is maybe the most common, so-
called Discounted Cash Flow model, or DCF. It estimates the value of a company based 
on its future cash flows. In these kinds of valuations, the weighted average cost of capital 
is usually used as a discount rate, as it takes into consideration the expected rate of re-
turn. The most important method for the issuing company depends on many factors, 
such as size, industry, and market. (Pörssisäätiö, 2016) 
 
According to Aggrawal et al. (2009), the valuation of IPOs plays a significant role in fi-
nance, as IPO provides public capital market players their first chance to value a set of 
corporate assets. However, the valuation of the IPOs seems to be very difficult, as the 
first-day close price usually differs a lot from the listing price. Reasons and motives be-
hind the valuation need to be revised to understand the pricing’s difficulty. While nu-
merous papers have studied whether accounting information is relevant for publicly 
traded stocks, there have been very few studies investigating the relationship between 
that information and IPO firms. Based on Kim and Ritter's (1999) studies, using historical 
benchmark accounting numbers results in very little precision in the valuations when 
they were used without further adjustments for profitability and growth. However, spe-
cific ratios, such as P/E, resulted in much more accurate valuations than historical ac-
counting information methods. Kim and Ritter (1999) underlined in their study that 
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investment bankers and underwriters have a significant role in the pricing of Initial Public 
Offerings. 
 
IPO underpricing is a phenomenon that has been widely studied in different markets 
worldwide. Underpricing of IPO means that the listing price has been set below its real 
value in the stock market. When a new stock closes its first day of trading above the 
listing price, it is considered to have been underpriced. The classic IPO literature offers a 
few leading theories on the determinants of underpricing. First, Allen and Faulhaber 
(1989) state that high-quality firms want to underprice their stocks to signal their high 
quality to the market. Higher underpricing allows them to raise more capital later with 
more favorable rates. Second, Ritter and Welsch (2002) theorize that possible underpric-
ing of IPOs is caused by information asymmetry between parties involved in the IPO val-
uation. Issues that are characterized by higher uncertainty are often priced cheaper in 
order to compensate for the risk. The IPO underpricing and reasons around it will be 
covered more widely during the “IPO Anomalies”-chapter.   
 
The difficulties of IPO valuations were further studied by Purnanandam et al. (2004), 
who found out that despite the widely known IPO underpricing, IPOs in their sample 
were actually overvalued on average. Purnanandam et al. (2004) claim that behavioral 
theories may explain the overvaluation. According to their research, the median IPO 
from their sample is overvalued by 50% relative to its benchmark firms. The most over-
valued IPOs based on their P/E-ratios earn from 5% to 7% higher first-day returns than 
low P/E-IPOs. Over a five-year period, overvalued IPOs underperform the undervalued 
IPOs by 20% to 50% depending on the benchmark industry. Even though the traditional 
theories of IPO pricing states that IPOs are undervalued, more recent studies have shown 
evidence of the possible overvaluation. Later in this thesis, it will be studied whether the 
traditional theories still stand on the Finnish IPOs.  
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3 Determinants of stock prices 
To completely understand the price behavior of a stock and price movements of IPO 
stocks, it is crucial to be familiar with underlying generally accepted theories. This chap-
ter aims to cover the basic notions of modern financial theory and explain market effi-
ciency studies. Initially, modern portfolio theory (MPT) will be covered. It is a theory on 
how one can construct a portfolio with minimized risk for a given level of expected return. 
Also, capital market efficiency will be covered, which leads to efficient market hypothesis 
and studies covering it. Lastly, this chapter introduces the most general stock valuation 
models to determine a stock’s fair value. 
 
 
3.1 Modern Portfolio Theory 
Stock prices and risk go hand in hand, and there are no exceptions. The investment de-
cision is always a trade-off between risk and return. Risk is defined as a change that an 
investment’s actual return will differ from an expected return. A rational investor invests 
only in situations where the expected return is sufficient compared to the risk in the 
situation. The risk can be divided into two parts, which are systematic risk and unsys-
tematic risk. Systematic risk, also known as market risk, undiversifiable risk, or volatility, 
is the risk inherent to the whole market or segment. It usually reflects the impact of more 
significant entities, such as economic or geopolitical factors. It is very much unpredicta-
ble and challenging to avoid. Unsystematic risk, known as diversifiable or specific risk, is, 
however, avoidable by diversification. Diversification means that a portfolio is formed 
using multiple different investments, including different assets and derivatives. (Bodie et 
al., 2014) 
 
 The modern era of diversification was kicked off by Markowitz (1952), who stated that 
risk and return profiles of single assets should not be viewed as individuals but in their 
portfolio context. This means that a portfolio can be considered efficient if its total risk 
is minimal compared to a given return level or its returns are maximally high compared 
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to a given level of risk (Pfaff, 2016). Markowitz’s modern portfolio theory’s key finding is 
that securities could not be selected just by their characteristics to construct a perfect 
portfolio. Investors need to consider how each asset co-moved with all other assets. 
Based on these facts, investors can construct a portfolio with the same expected return 
and less risk than a portfolio constructed by ignoring the interactions between securities 
(Elton & Gruber, 1997). In practice, this means that the unsystematic risk measured with 
a standard deviation of expected returns reduces every time an eligible asset is added 
to the portfolio. According to Markowitz’s (1952) findings, the rational investor always 
chooses the portfolio with the highest ratio between excepted returns divided by the 
total risk. This particular portfolio lies on the efficient frontier.  
 
 
Figure 1. Capital market line and the efficient frontier. 
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3.2 Capital Market Efficiency 
To describe efficient markets, it is helpful first to contrast them with perfect capital mar-
kets. The following four suppositions are necessary for perfect capital markets to work 
(Copeland et al. 1983). These conditions make markets operationally and allocative effi-
cient. 
 
- Markets are visible and balanced, which means there are no transaction costs or taxes, 
and all assets are perfectly marketable and available for everyone 
- Competition is perfect in the product and securities market 
- All information is available for everyone; it is costless and simultaneously available for 
all individuals 
- All individuals are entirely rational 
 
Not every condition needs to be filled for markets to be efficient. The only requirement 
for efficient markets is that everyone can react immediately to all information available. 
In practice, all markets are seen to be incomplete, at least to some extent. The more 
markets fill previously mentioned conditions, the more efficient they become. 
 
 
3.2.1 The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) 
The hypothesis of market efficiency is created by Eugene Fama (1970). He states that an 
efficient market is defined as a market where large numbers of rational, profit maximiz-
ers are actively competing, each trying to predict future market values of individual se-
curities, and where important current information is almost freely available to all partic-
ipants. In an efficient market, competition among the many intelligent participants leads 
to a situation where at any point in time, actual prices of individual securities already 
reflect the effects of information based both on events that have already occurred and 
on events which, as of now, the market expects to take place in the future. 
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Fama (1970) claims that stocks should always trade at their correct value, reflecting on 
all information available. Due to this statement that stocks should always trade reflecting 
on all information available, it would be impossible to “beat the market” as the prices 
are constantly reacting with emphasis to the new information. According to Fama’s 
(1970) market efficiency theory, overvalued or undervalued securities are impossible to 
find. The market efficiency hypothesis by Fama (1970) is a consequence of earlier studies, 
which include financial models such as efficient markets theory and random walk hy-
pothesis, which states that stock market price changes are random. The efficient market 
theory became popular in the 1960s when computers started calculating and comparing 
prices of hundreds of stocks more effortlessly. The efficient market theory is strongly 
linked with the random walk hypothesis because market prices are seen to reflect all 
available information, so the prices change only in response to news (Fama, 1970). 
 
The market efficiency hypothesis and its existence have been a controversial topic over 
the years, as some studies oppose its idea. Some investors are said to be demonstrably 
less rational, which makes the pricing irrelative as it does not fully reflect the recent news 
and information. Because of irrationally, the efficiency of the market decreases (Malkiel 
2003). The non-efficient market enables discovering repetitive patterns from the stock 
price movements, making abnormal stock returns possible (Hamid et al., 2017). The ef-
ficient market hypothesis has been said to be the most misunderstood theory of finance. 
Even though stocks’ prices may increase or decrease, they still eventually return to their 
correct value due to market efficiency. Efficient markets should be seen as a self-correct-
ing mechanism. There might be seen some ineffectiveness in the market, but the effec-
tive markets eventually repair the prices after investors have exploited them. (Puttonen 




3.2.2 Three levels of efficient markets 
The efficient market theory’s efficiency is usually divided into three different levels, each 
having different implications for how markets work (Fama & Malkiel 1970). Levy and 
Sarnat (1994) define Fama’s and Malkiel’s levels (1970) as follows: 
 
1. Weak form efficiency. The markets are efficient in a weak form, which means excess 
returns are not possible in the long-term. Future prices cannot be predicted by analyzing 
previous prices. The price movements are not connected to previous movements, mak-
ing abnormal returns impossible for investors to earn. 
 
2. Semi-strong form efficiency. The markets are efficient in a semi-strong form when se-
curities’ prices reflect immediately and without exceptions to all recently published in-
formation. Investors cannot get any returns above average with all published infor-
mation available because every investor is buying and selling stocks with the same data. 
 
3. Strong form efficiency. The markets are efficient in a strong form when all public and 
unpublished relevant information is reflected in the securities’ prices. Abnormal returns 
are impossible to earn, even with insider information. 
 
The three previously explained forms are all connected. To fill the requirements for semi-
strong form, the market needs to be initially efficient in weak form. Respectively, the 
market needs to be efficient in a semi-strong form before being efficient in a strong form. 
Markets would not reflect all relevant public and unpublished information if one of the 
form’s requirements were not filled. It is argued that strong form efficiency never occurs 





3.3 Valuation Models 
Valuation is the analytical process of determining the current or expected worth of a 
security. Valuation models are tools to be used when doing the valuation. Different mod-
els or methods produced a different outcome, depending on the variables involved in 
the analytical process. The purpose of the valuation is to find the fundamental value for 
security. This value can also be called a fair or intrinsic value. In simple terms, the intrinsic 
value of a company’s stock is a combination of its earnings, dividends, and expected 
growth rate. Even though these three variables are easy to value mathematically, the 
process of choosing a correct method that satisfactorily uses all these concepts to price 
a stock’s value is a difficult task. First, in this subchapter, the different pricing models will 
be introduced and briefly explained. Last, the most important and widely used funda-
mental variables are discussed with their pros and cons.  
 
 
3.3.1 Capital Asset Pricing Model 
As the fundamental approach to efficient markets has now been implemented, it is es-
sential to introduce the Capital Asset Pricing –model (CAPM), which Fama et al. (1970) 
introduced to calculate securities’ expected returns. Traditional asset-pricing models 
were firstly discovered in the early 1960s to make predictions about asset returns. The 
CAPM is the most known and used asset-pricing model in the literature, and it was first 
introduced in the scientific publications by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Mossin 
(1966). The CAPM aims to determine an expected rate of return for security theoretically. 
With the expected rate of return, the model defines an expected price for the security. 
The riskier the asset, the lower the present value of its future cash flows. The theoretical 
form of the CAPM can be expressed as follows:  
 






𝐸(𝑟𝑖)  = expected return for the capital asset (i) 
𝑅𝑓 = risk-free rate of interest 
𝛽 𝑖 = beta 
𝐸(𝑟𝑚) = expected return of the market 
 
The basic idea of the CAPM formula is that the expected return of a security or a portfolio 
is a value of risk-free security plus a risk premium. (𝐸(𝑟𝑚)-𝑅𝑓 equals to the risk premium). 
According to CAPM, investors need compensation for two variables. The first one is the 
time value of money. Time value of money means that money available at present is 
worth more than the same amount in the future. Investors favor having the money now 
than getting it later because of the money’s potential growth. The second of the varia-
bles is risk. The risk-part defines the amount of compensation the investor needs for 
taking that additional risk. 
 
3.3.2 Arbitrage Pricing Theory 
 
Ross introduced the first respectable alternative for CAPM in 1976. It is called Arbitrage 
Pricing Theory (APT). Unlike CAPM, APT does not rely on just one factor. Instead, it takes 
into consideration multiple factors, typically macroeconomic. APT’s basic idea is that an 
asset’s returns can be predicted using the linear relationship between the asset’s ex-
pected return and several macroeconomic variables that capture systematic risk. APT 
and CAPM differ a lot when it comes to efficient markets. Unlike CAPM, APT assumes 
that markets sometimes misprice assets before the market eventually corrects asset 
prices to their fair value. The main advantage of Ross’s APT is that its empirical testability 
does not hinge upon knowledge of the market’s portfolio (Huberman, 1982). 
 
 APT’s formula can be expressed as follows: 
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(2)   𝐸(𝑟𝑖) = 𝛽1𝑖𝐸(𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟1) + 𝛽2𝑖𝐸(𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟2) + ⋯ 𝛽𝑛𝑖𝐸(𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑛) 
 
Where: 
𝐸(𝑟𝑖)   = the expected return for security i 
𝐸(𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑛)  = return on factor n 
𝛽𝑛    = the factor loading of security i on factor n 
 
 
3.3.3 Dividend Discount Model 
Maybe the most simplified valuation method is the dividend discount model (DDM), also 
known as the Gordon Growth Model, brought to daylight in 1962 by Myron J. Gordon. 
Since then, this valuation model has been widely accepted and used for determining the 
value of the discounted cash flow (DCF) method, which will be discussed later in this 
chapter (Hitchner, 2011). 
 
The DDM formula is usually expressed as follows: 
 








𝑃0 = stock price at a time 0 
𝐷𝑡 = dividend at time t  
r = required rate of return 
 
While the DDM method is easy to use and available in many kinds of financial valuation 
ns, its simplicity often leads to misuses or mistakes. For example, the dividend growth 




3.3.4 Discounted Free Cash Flow Model 
Given the demerits of DDM, it is often more reasonable to use the discounted free cash 
flow model (DCF). Instead of dividends used in DDM, DCF discounts the free cash flows 
of the company. In DCF, any operating asset’s value is equal to its present value of the 
expected economic benefit stream (Hitchner, 2011). In DCF, the present value of ex-
pected future cash flows is arrived at by using a discount rate to calculate the discounted 
cash flow (DCF). Its benefits to DDM are the immunity to dividend policy and the added 
benefit that the accounting standards do not affect the amount of free cash flow, FCF. 
The DCF’s most significant limitation is the inaccuracy in the estimations on future cash 
flows that it relies on.  
 
The discounted cash flow is often calculated assuming the firm is all-equity financed. The 
formula is expressed as follows: 
 








𝑃0 = stock price at a time 0 
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑡 = free cash flow at time t  
r = required rate of return 
 
 
3.3.5 Fundamental Variables 
Investors and financial analysts evaluate a company’s fundamentals to compare its eco-
nomic performance relative to its industry peers or to itself over time. Fundamental ra-
tios, also called fundamental variables, are the most vital tools for that kind of evaluation. 
The most used variables in IPO valuation were briefly mentioned in the second chapter 
of this thesis. Following this introduction to the fundamental variables, three very gen-
erally used ratios are explained to clarify a company’s stock valuation.  
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The most used and the most known fundamental variable is called price to earnings (P/E). 
It is a very straightforward ratio comparing a firm’s stock price to its yearly earnings. It 
describes how many years it takes for earnings to reach a company’s market value (Kal-
lunki et al., 2002). The basic rule is that P/E-ratios should be used for comparisons only 
within a homogenous group of stocks as possible. However, like all indicators, P/E has its 
own flaws. Growth expectations between firms are not taken into consideration. As 
stock price reflects all upcoming expectations, growth companies’ valuation levels are 
higher, even though the current year’s earnings are expected to be the same. Due to this, 
growth companies’ P/E-ratios are inherently higher than lower growth companies (Kal-
lunki et al., 2002). 
 
The most common ratio concerning a company’s balance sheet substance is the share 
price ratio to the balance sheet value of equity per share, the price to book (P/B) ratio 
(Kallunki et al., 2002). The P/B implicates the value that market participants attach to a 
company’s equity relative to its equity book value. The difference between a book value 
and stock value comes from possible growth potential. Previous studies show that P/B 
has a weak power to predict market returns (Lewellen, 2002).  
 
Finally, size (market value of the firm) can be counted as a fundamental variable, alt-
hough it is not ratio as the previously mentioned variables are. Size as a variable became 
a popular indicator when Banz (1981) found out that stocks of small caps had outper-
formed large caps over several decades in the NYSE. Hence, the market anomaly called 
“the small firm effect” was introduced. Since then, more recent studies have shown the 
size effect to be a proxy for risk. On the other hand, with IPOs, the small firm effect has 
been studied to be valid only for initial returns, while it is invalid for long-run returns. 
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4 IPO Anomalies and the theories explaining them 
Anomalies associated with IPOs have been studied during the last three decades. The 
two most known anomalies that characterize IPOs are first-day underpricing and long-
term underperformance. Even though both subjects have been studied widely, it is fair 
to say that they remain unsolved to some extent (Guo et al., 2006). This chapter will 
introduce both the first-day underpricing and the long-term underperformance, includ-
ing motives and studies behind them. As suggested, the underpricing in this thesis will 
be calculated as a change between the offer price and the first-day closing price. 
 
 
4.1 IPO Underpricing  
First-day IPO Underpricing happens when, during the first-day trading, the IPO stock 
closes higher than the listing price was set. The underpricing is calculated as a percent-
age of the price at which the assets were sold to the buyers at the time of the IPO com-
pared to the price the shares subsequently closed on the first day on the market after 
the IPO launch. In well-developed capital markets, the underpricing seems to disappear 
reasonably quickly. In most of the research, the first-day closing price is used to calculate 
underpricing. In less developed markets, the underpricing may occur longer due to si-
tuations where there are restrictions on the price fluctuation.  
 
In the 1980s, the average first-day returns on IPOs in U.S Markets was 7%. During the 
following decade, the average first-day returns doubled to almost 15%. The most sub-
stantial evidence for the IPO underpricing has been documented during the IT-bubble 
when first-day average returns climbed to 65% (Loughran & Ritter, 2004). One of the first 
research associated with IPO underpricing in Finland is created by Keloharju (1993). The 
research data consists of IPOs in Finland between 1984 and 1989, including 80 offerings 
from a possible 91. 11 IPOs are excluded from the sample because of missing and incor-
rect information. Keloharju’s (1993) results from his Finnish IPOs sample show that the 
average initial excess return is 8.7%, which means that the underpricing is confirmed. 
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The results do not differ from other IPO studies made at that time, even though Kelo-
harju’s sample period and market were quite different in terms of attributes and size. 
Keloharju’s results suggest that during the sample time, the smallest IPOs were the most 
underpriced. (Keloharju, 1993)  
 
The IPO underpricing has changed over time. Even though it still exists, the level of un-
derpricing has changed a lot during the last decades. The reasons why IPOs underprice 
vary depending upon the environment. In some cases, the increased (or decreased) un-
derpricing is correlated to the risk. It is called the changing composition hypothesis 
(Loughran & Ritter, 2004). The underpricing of IPOs issued in the 1980s U.S markets can 
be partly explained by the winner’s curse problem and the dynamic information acqui-
sition. During the IT-bubble, analyst coverages, side payments to CEOs, and venture cap-
italists might have increased the underpricing of IPOs (Loughran & Ritter, 2004).  
 
The relation between IPO underpricing and board gender diversity has not been widely 
studied. However, few studies connecting previously mentioned topics have been done. 
Kaur and Singh (2015) studied the relation in Indian markets. The purpose of their study 
was to explore the benefits of having women on the board at the time of IPO launch, 
specifically in terms of reduction in first-day trading returns. Their result indicates no 
impact of female directors’ presence on IPO underpricing, thereby meaning that female 
directors on the board at the time of IPO fail to act as ‘quality signals’ to reduce under-
pricing in India. However, the equality and the social status of women in India and Fin-
land differ a lot. It needs to be taken into consideration while reviewing this sort of pre-
vious literature. Reutzel and Belsito (2014) explored how initial public offering (IPO) in-
vestors view female presence on boards of directors in the USA. Their study’s findings 
suggest that US IPO investors react negatively to the female presence on the board of 
directors. However, this negative effect has weakened the post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
Reutzel & Belsito claim that their study represents one of the first studies to consider the 
influence of director gender on IPO performance, which practically means that the entity 
studied in this thesis is relatively recent and not widely explored. 
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Winner’s curse hypothesis is a theory designed by Rock (1986), and it helps to analyze 
the IPO underpricing. The winner’s curse is a tendency for the winning bid in an auction 
to overrun the fair value of the asset. The gap between fair and paid value can usually 
be explained by incomplete information, bidders, and emotions. According to Rock’s 
studies, there are two kinds of market participants: informed and uninformed investors. 
The first group has better information about the listing firm’s cash flows and financial 
state, so they are more aware of the profitable and unprofitable issues. Their knowledge 
of the issuing company’s fair value is also better than the underwriters and issuing firms. 
Consequently, investors with better information crowd out the others when the issuing 
company’s price is set below the fair value. On the other hand, they know to withdraw 
when overpriced assets are offered. The overpriced IPO shares are unsubscribed be-
cause informed investors avoid buying them. Uninformed investors consequently lose 
money, although they “won” by managing to get the shares. Because uninformed inves-
tors are wanted in the market, the IPO issuers have to give them compensation against 
adverse allocation bias through underpricing. Practically, IPOs are underpriced on pur-
pose, according to the winner’s curse hypothesis (Rock, 1986). Keloharju (1993) found 
similar evidence of the existence of the winner’s curse in Finnish markets.  
 
Another famous theory explaining IPO underpricing is called the informational cascades 
hypothesis (Welch, 1992). It emphasizes the information asymmetry between investors.  
An information cascade occurs when an investor decides to invest in an IPO based on 
other people’s information while ignoring his knowledge of the situation to the contrary.  
More specifically, the information cascades hypothesis states that the issuers underprice 
IPO to induce a few influential investors to buy initially. Thus, less rational investors may 
mimic influential investors, which leads to higher demand and a higher closing price on 
the first trading day. If influential investors find the price to be too high, they avoid sub-
scribing to it. This may lead to a mass exodus from the IPO. To prevent this, the issuer 
may decrease the listing price. Westerholm (2006) considers the information asymmetry 
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in his study, offering a relatively different result than previous studies. His results show 
that clustering is weakly and positively related to high initial returns. 
 
Another theory on IPO underpricing studied by Welsch (1989) and Allen and Faulhaber 
(1989) is the signalling hypothesis. A theory suggests that a company may want to un-
derprice its IPO purposely to indicate a positive future prospect. Underpricing is stated 
to be a tool used by the issuing company to signal their high quality. Based on the sig-
nalling hypothesis, one of the motives for underpricing is the increasing possibility of 
SEOs, leading to higher returns. In other words, this theory believes that a listing com-
pany creates a multiple issue strategy in the form of a lower subscription price. However, 
Michaely and Shaw (1994) found little evidence to support the signalling hypothesis the-
ory. Their studies suggest that companies that are underpriced in their IPOs create 
weaker future earnings and dividends. On the other hand, in their studies, Álvarez and 
González (2005) found out similar results to Welsch (1989), which supported a positive 
relationship between long-run performance with underpricing and the gross proceeds 
obtained in SEOs. 
 
One of the most studied symmetric information-based theories on IPO underpricing is 
the lawsuit avoidance hypothesis by Tinic (1988). According to the lawsuit avoidance hy-
pothesis, IPO companies want to underprice their shares on purpose to decrease the 
number of possible lawsuits by investors. Thereby, the issuing companies use underpric-
ing as insurance against legal liability. The lawsuit avoidance hypothesis was empirically 
studied in Finland by Keloharju (1993). However, he did not find any significant support 
for the hypothesis. According to Keloharju (1993), different characteristics between 
Finnish and U.S. laws cause opposite findings. In Finland, IPO attendants have much less 
incentive than those in the U.S. to take legal action if the prospectus contains false or 
inadequate information about the issuing company. Consistent with Tinic (1988), Lin et 
al. (2012) found evidence to support the lawsuit avoidance hypothesis in an international 
environment. Their results show a significant positive relationship between underpricing 
and all litigation risk proxies. However, their studies resulted in a significant negative 
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relationship between underpricing and law enforcement’s quality, which suggests that 
better enforcement of the securities laws reduces the level of underpricing. 
 
As seen above, behavioral finance and psychology strongly influence theories explaining 
IPO underpricing. A company with a female majority on the board may behave differ-
ently than a more traditional company, which is having a male-oriented board.  In prac-
tice, this is the topic that will be empirically examined in this thesis.   
 
Author(s) Market Period IPOs Initial 
Ritter (1991) The U.S. 1975-1984 1526 14,1 %* 
Keloharju (1993) Finland 1984-1989 80 8,7 %* 
Rajan et al. (1997) The U.S. 1975-1987 2725 10,0 % 
Purnanandam et al. (2004) The U.S. 1980-1997 2288 11,4 %* 
Álvarez et al. (2005) Spain 1987-1997 52 13,0 %* 
Westerholm (2006) Denmark 1991-2002 51 8,5 % 
  Finland   55 21,9 % 
  Norway   102 22,2 % 
  Sweden   82 15,9 % 
Hahl et al. (2014) Finland 1994-2006 67 15,62%* 
 
Table 1. Earlier studies of initial returns on IPOs. Returns denoted with* are market adjusted. 
 
 
4.2 Long-term IPO underperformance 
The second crucial IPO anomaly is called long-term IPO underperformance. This anomaly 
was established by Ritter (1991). During that time, two significant anomalies dominated 
the scene around IPOs: IPO underpricing and the “hot issue” market phenomenon. In-
stead of focusing on them, Ritter (1991) studied the long-term performance of IPOs. Us-
ing a sample of 1526 U.S. IPOs that went public between 1975 and 1984, he found out 
that firms significantly underperformed a set of comparable companies matched by size 
and industry after three years of the listing. The average return on the three-year holding 
period was -17%. Younger firms and firms listing on high volume years performed even 
worse than the average. Remarkable in Ritter’s (1991) studies was his methodology. In-
stead of using market indexes, he created his own indexes consisting of matching firms 
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by size and industry. Another significant difference to previous literature was that Ritter 
(1991) excluded the initial first-day returns from his data. In brief, his main finding was 
the anomaly itself: In the long-term, IPOs tend to be overpriced.  
 
Keloharju (1993) had many similarities to Ritter in his methodology while studying Finn-
ish IPOs.  His results corresponded strongly to Ritter’s results and so supported the Long-
term IPO underperformance anomaly in Finland. Nordic IPO markets were further stud-
ied by Westerholm (2006), whose research sample included IPOs between 1992 and 
2002 from Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. Westerholm’s (2006) research 
showed changes in Finnish IPOs. The long-term IPO underperformance had deepened 
since Keloharju’s (1993) study was conducted from a sample ending in 1989. In fact, dur-
ing a five-year period, the market index generated twice as much value as the Finnish 
IPOs. In Sweden, the IPOs performed poorly too. However, in Denmark and Norway, the 
newly issued IPOs outperformed the market in a long-term period. The author argued 
that the Norwegian economy, which relies on natural resources, did not suffer that 
poorly from the IT-bubble end. Besides, the low number of ICT-IPOs increased long-run 
performance during the sample period. Westerholm (2006) stated that weak long-run 
performance occurred because of momentary overvaluation in the hype-industries, sup-
porting Ritter’s (1991) U.S. market results.  
 
Author(s) Market Period IPOs Long-Run 
Ritter (1991) The U.S. 1975-1984 1526 0.83* 
Keloharju (1993) Finland 1984-1989 80 0.73* 
Purnanandam et al. (2004) The U.S. 1980-1997 2288 -19,4% 
Álvarez et al. (2005) Spain 1987-1997 52 0.78* 
Westerholm (2006) Denmark 1991-2002 51 1.6% 
  Finland   55 -49,0% 
  Norway   102 17,8% 
  Sweden   82 -17,4% 
Hahl et al. (2014) Finland 1994-2006 67 0,78* 
 
Table 2. Earlier studies on long-run performance on IPOs. Results denoted with* are calculated 




As seen from the table, IPOs tend to underperform the benchmarks in the long-term. In 
addition to the apparent underperformance, most of these abnormalities seem to be 
statistically significant. Given the relatively small sample size in the European studies, 
the great magnitude of the phenomena confirms this fact and rejects the possibility of 
them being coincidental. However, some exceptions can also be found, as shown in the 
table, but they have often been explained by ample evidence. 
 
The first recognizable theory explaining long-term IPO performance is made by Miller 
(1997), and it is called the divergence of opinion hypothesis. As the name of the hypoth-
esis states, the divergence of opinion may lead to the asset's overvaluation. Investors 
may have different opinions on a firm’s financial performance and potential. As the most 
optimistic investors buy the issues, the price increases in the early aftermarket. The 
spread between opinions converges because optimistic and pessimistic opinions come 
closer to each other as time goes by. Hence, investors’ disagreement on the valuation 
becomes less volatile, which causes the market price to fall. Purnanandam et al. (2004) 
confirm this hypothesis in their study on the U.S market.  
 
The overconfidence hypothesis by Daniel et al. (1998) asserts that investors with inside 
information are overconfident and tend to underreact to public news and reports. It 
causes initial overvaluation, which will even out over time. Based on this theory, the IPOs 
are overvalued before listing and even more overvalued during the first day of the after-
market life. The overvaluation weakens over time, which makes the IPO underperform 
in the long-term. This hypothesis was also supported by Purnanandam et al. (2004). 
Their finding indicated that an IPO investor’s overconfident state of mind could continue 
for months, but not for years.  
 
Fads hypothesis is a very current topic; however, the hypothesis was created as early as 
the 90s by Shiller (1990). Fads hypothesis argues that the IPOs abnormal initial returns 
do not occur because of the underpricing. However, it is overvalued due to the over-
optimistic forecasts (fads) during the first day after listing. So, the fads hypothesis claims 
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that IPOs are not underpriced, but investors tend to overvalue them during the first days 
of aftermarket trading. Because of the eventual mean reversion, the long-term IPO per-
formance and initial returns due to underpricing have negative correlation. Wester-
holm’s (2006) results supported the fads hypothesis, as fads were found in the Finnish 
IPO market at the millennium turn. Evidence supporting the fads hypothesis was also 
found in the U.S. and U.K. markets provided by Ritter (1991) and Lewis (1993).  
 
In addition to all theories explaining the long-term underperformance of IPOs, few stud-
ies argue that the long-run underperformance of IPOs does not exist. The most signifi-
cant research against the long-term underpricing of IPOs is produced by Fama (1998), 
who stated that reasonable changes in technique make most anomalies disappear. With 
Fama’s 3-factor model, IPOs can outperform their benchmarks, according to studies by 
Brav et al. (2000). The choice of the benchmark significantly affects the possible abnor-
mal initial returns. However, it must be stated that even though beta and size can be 
seen as a synonym for risk, B/M is not, especially considering IPOs.  
 
 
4.3 Hot Issue Markets 
Last, it is essential to discuss and introduce the hot issue markets, a period with extraor-
dinarily high listing activity. It became public knowledge after Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) 
introduced it in their paper. The hot issue markets are considered as the third primary 
anomaly regarding the IPOs. During these periods with high listing activity, the IPO un-
derpricing has been documented to be even higher than during regular periods. In their 
study, Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) claim that investors can easily exploit this anomaly and 
earn high initial returns by recognizing the high listing activity periods. This causes mar-
ket inefficiency.  
 
Evidence for the hot issue markets has been found consistently after its discovery. Ritter 
(1984) discovered a period with high listing activity a decade after Ibbotson (1975). The 
main finding in his paper was the positive relationship between initial returns and risk. 
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Ibbotson et al. (1994) took this matter further, discovering that since riskier IPOs are 
more underpriced to a greater extent than their less risky equivalents, the changes in 
risk might explain the fluctuation in average initial returns. This means that when there 
is a period with riskier firms listing public, they are expected to gain higher initial returns. 
As with other IPO-related anomalies, the hot issue markets are typical in Scandinavia too. 
Keloharju (1993) recorded an extraordinarily high listing activity between 1988-1989 in 
Finnish markets. Slightly over dozen years later, Westerholm (2006) detected that Nordic 
IPOs in the same industries tend to cluster when optimism dominates the market. A 
great example was the IT-boom in 2000 when almost all Finnish IPOs came from com-




5 Board of Directors and Gender Diversity 
Gender representation on boards of directors refers to the proportion of women and 
men representing the company on the board. The gender diversity of the board of direc-
tors is usually expressed as a percentage of the women holding board seats. The number 
of women on the board of directors has been increasing recently, as the European aver-
age nearly doubled in six years between 2001-2006. In the Nordic countries, the repre-
sentation has always been higher than average, and for example, in Sweden, the per-
centage was 21,3% in 2007 (Cambell & Mínguez-Vera, 2008). Usually, diversity is seen as 
a value-adding resource for the company. In general, diversity and diversification reduce 
the risk. This can be seen happening in the board of directors, too, as the diversity re-
duces group thinking, a psychological behavior including lack of criticism and conflict 
aversion. This chapter aims to introduce the previous literature connecting the compa-
ny's IPO performance and its board’s gender diversity. Concepts like the board of direc-
tors, gender diversity, agency theory, resource dependency theory and gender differ-
ences in risk behavior will be explained. 
 
 
5.1 Board of directors  
Corporate governance is the entity including rules, practices and processes used to man-
age and direct a company. The board of directors is a primary force of a firm’s corporate 
governance. In publicly listed companies, the board of directors is selected with elections 
to represent the shareholders. The board of directors is responsible for the company, 
and they are in charge together with shareholders. According to regulations, the board 
of directors is a mandatory operator in a publicly listed company, and it serves as an 
advisory unit for the management. The board of directors serves a different purpose 
than management, as its objective is to advise management on corporate strategy rather 
than develop it (Larcker & Tayan, 2011). A board member’s purpose in a listed company 
is to act in the shareholders’ best interest. 
 
40 
According to Larcker and Tayan (2011), the board of directors has two fundamental re-
sponsibilities: advise the management and monitor its operations. The board of directors 
is usually selected based on their business and leadership abilities. The board of directors 
selects its chief executive officer (CEO) for the company, who manages the company. In 
Finland, publicly listed companies have specific special legal requirements that affect the 
board of directors’ operations. In addition to annual reports, the publicly listed compa-
nies have to produce quarterly reports. Also, the CEO and at least three board members 
are required. Regulation of the board of directors in Finnish publicly trading companies 
is mainly controller by the Limited Liability Company Act (OYL (624/2006)). In Finland, 
the board of directors is responsible for accounting, governance, and the company’s fi-
nancial management, as mentioned in chapters six § 2–7 (OYL). The opinion of the ma-
jority constitutes board decisions when at least half of the board members are present. 
A member can be disqualified from the decision-making if their interest argues against 
the company’s essential benefit. The Chairman of the board is responsible for organizing 
a board meeting when necessary.  
 
Board members usually have a strong background in business and have a great under-
standing of financial reporting. Also, board members are usually very educated, and they 
have often graduated with either Ph.D. or master’s degree. Board of director members 
tends to sit on several boards at the same time. If board members have too many posi-
tions, they are considered “busy board members.” According to Fich and Shivdasani 
(2006), companies with these kinds of members are associated with poor corporate gov-
ernance. Compared to benchmark firms, these companies had lower book-to-market ra-
tios and overall weaker financial performance than companies with board members op-
erating in just one board of directors. 
 
 
5.2 Gender Diversity  
Diversity in the field of business refers to a heterogeneous group of people with diverse 
backgrounds. Previous literature has introduced two distinctions of diversity, 
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demographic and cognitive. Demographic, also called observable diversity, contains mat-
ters related to racial, ethnic, or political diversity. Furthermore, demographic diversity 
includes gender-related matters. Cognitive, also known as non-observable diversity, can 
be based on education and personality characteristics (Erhardt et al., 2003). Most of the 
research on diversity and firm performance usually focuses on demographic diversity 
due to its observability. This thesis focuses on gender diversity, as it is a trendy topic, and 
the number of women on the board has been increasing during recent decades. National 
specialties and regulations regarding the board of directors’ diversity were introduced in 
the previous chapter. They need to be considered when studying the relation between 
IPO performance and board gender diversity.  
 
Since 2008, the Finnish Corporate Governance Code has included a precise recommen-
dation that both sexes should be represented on the board. Since that, women's average 
growth rate on the board has been approximately 1-2% per year. Of all Finnish publicly 
traded companies, just 9 (7%) have a female CEO in 2020.  Virtanen (2010) has studies 
the roles and behavior of Finnish members of the board. She found out that both men 
and women are quite the same by characteristics, such as family status and educational 
background. Over 60% of the board members have graduated with either master’s de-
gree or a Ph.D. According to Virtanen’s (2010) studies, female members’ lower average 
age was statistically significant.  In short, the Finnish female board members were more 
flexible, more active; they enjoyed using their power more than men and had a higher 






Figure 2. Years 2006 and 2017 of women in the boardroom of the largest publicly traded firm  
of the EU_28 countries (European Institute of Gender Equality, 2019).  
 
 
As seen in the table above, the number of women in the board room has drastically 
increased during the last ten years. The European average has increased from 10,4% to 
25,0% during this sample period. The most significant transformation has occurred in 
France and Italy, as both countries’ number of women on the board of directors has in-
creased by over 25%. Nordic countries are well represented in the tables, as all of them 
belong to the top half of the EU_28 in terms of gender diversity during 2003-2016. A few 
motives are explaining the increased number of women on the board. First is self-regu-
lation, which is usually part of the countries Corporate Governance Core. Some regula-
tions require an explanation if the company does not have both genders sitting on the 
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5.2.1  Agency theory and Gender Diversity 
The agency theory was first introduced to finance by Fama (1980). Agency theory con-
siders the relationship between the agent (manager) and the principal (shareholder) and 
the difference in priorities between the agent and the principal. The manager may not 
be as motivated as the shareholder to pursue the company’s interest, yet he or she is 
responsible for managing the business. When the control and ownership of the company 
are separated, an agency cost may arise. Agency theory examines how agency loss could 
be reduced. The board of directors has an essential role in acting between shareholders 
and managers of the company. They need to forward shareholders’ wishes to managers 
who make decisions considering the business itself.   
 
According to Nyberg et al. (2010), one of the critical problems for businesses is the in-
creased agency costs that arise from asymmetric information and the difference in pri-
orities between managers and shareholders. Typical solutions for agency problems are 
contract designs and compensations. However, the agency cost cannot be wholly elimi-
nated, as firms’ managers cannot always make optimal decisions for shareholders even 
if it is their own company (Nyberg et al., 2010). The agency cost can usually be minimized 
by good corporate governance and smooth information (Reguera-Alvardo et al., 2017). 
Fama (1980) claims that with adequate monitoring and informing by the board of direc-
tors, its performance can be improved. It has been argued that more diverse companies 
have smaller agency costs, as they have both smoother information and monitoring.  
 
Previous literature has suggested that female directors better monitor and inform CEOs 
and managers than male directors. In their research, Francoeur et al. (2007) studied 
whether a higher proportion of women on the board of directors affects the firm’s per-
formance. Their result indicates significantly higher returns on firms that operate in a 
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complex environment with a higher proportion of women on the board. However, if the 
environment is neutral, there seem to be no significantly higher returns on firms having 
more women on the board. On the other hand, more gender-diverse firms can outper-
form their benchmark companies due to the benefits of having a diverse board of direc-
tors. These benefits include higher motivation, better monitoring skills, better infor-
mation flow and increased attendance in the board meetings. 
 
 
5.2.2  Resource dependence theory and Gender Diversity 
Resource dependence theory (RDF) explains how a company’s performance and behav-
ior depend on its external resources. Resource dependence theory is based on the idea 
that organizations depend on multidimensional resources, such as labor, capital, and raw 
material. Organizations are dependent on one another and other entities in that context. 
These other external entities handle essential resources, creating challenges and uncer-
tainties for other organizations (Muhammad et al., 2013). The role of a board of directors 
in this theory is to act between the company and external resources to perform as well 
as possible. According to Dalton et al. (1999), companies that are better at controlling 
recourses and dealing with environmental uncertainty can perform better.  
 
Diversity in this theory is characterized as the knowledge about the industry, relation-
ships with customers, and the industry itself. According to Reguera-Alvardo (2017), the 
more diverse board often has more knowledge concerning the environment, which leads 
to increased performance. Board diversity helps to build linkages between critical exter-
nal stakeholders. Companies may reduce uncertainties and dependencies if they operate 
with a diverse board. For example, younger managers may be more familiar with tech-
nological recourses, whereas older directors might have more senior contacts in estab-
lished firms (Muhammad et al., 2013).  A diverse board signals stakeholders about the 
equal background, which might attract consumers from a broader range than a more 
conservative board of directors. Besides, a diverse board could increase access to a 
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broader range of consumers. Compared with male networks, female networks are often 
more diverse and are more likely to contain weak ties. 
 
 
5.2.3  Gender Differences in Risk Behavior 
Many studies have focused on gender differences in risk behavior, especially in cognitive 
psychology and behavioral economics literature. The questions are whether men and 
women act differently when it comes to risk. The studies around this topic differ with 
results regarding gender’s risk behavior. The well-known stereotype states that men are 
less risk-averse and make more risky financial decisions (Levin et al. 1988). Consequently, 
men are seen to seek more risk compared to women. 
 
Mateos et al. (2010) examined relationships between riskiness and board gender diver-
sity. Their findings suggest that less risky banks usually have more women on the board. 
They state that these banks seem to be more risk-averse. Palvia et al. (2015) studied 
whether female board chairmen and CEOs are more conservative and risk-averse in the 
banking industry during the financial crisis. Their findings are in line with previously men-
tioned beliefs. Their result shows support for the view that female board members and 
CEOs may inherently promote more conservative strategies and less risky financial deci-
sions. 
 
Sila et al. (2016) were among the firsts to study boardroom gender diversity's affection 
to firm risk in non-financial organizations. Their results show no evidence of female 
boardroom representation affecting any of the equity risk measures included in their 
study. Sila et al. (2016) state, based on their research, that a board with a high number 
of women is no more less risk-taking than a more male-dominated board. Their results 
are explained by high carefulness when identifying the causal relationship between di-




6    Data and Methodology 
In this chapter, the data and methodology used to examine the research hypotheses em-
pirically will be introduced. As mentioned in the introduction, the first hypothesis sug-
gests that a greater female board presence reduces IPO underpricing. The second hy-
pothesis states that IPOs with higher female board presence perform better in the long 
run than IPOs with lower female board presence. Here, long-term means a one-year per-
formance. First, the data used in this research will be discussed, and its characteristics 
and sources will be named. Secondly, it will be explained how the IPOs are classified 
based on the women's presence on the board. Subsequently, the research methodology 
applied to investigate IPO underpricing and long-term performance is described in two 
parts. First, the market-adjusted methodology is presented, and following that, the risk-
adjusted, calendar-time approach is introduced. 
 
 
6.1 Data Description 
Data for this thesis was collected from a few different sources. The list of Finnish IPOs 
was collected from the Thomson Reuters database. The listing dates, IPO firms' board of 
directors and offering prices of Finnish IPOs between 2013 and 2018 were collected from 
listing prospectuses and companies' public statements. 2013 was selected to be the 
starting year, as two previous years had no IPOs in the Finnish market. 2018 had to be 
the ending years as one-year performance after the IPO is necessary for the second hy-
pothesis's methodology. Several IPOs were excluded from the sample due to incomplete 
information regarding either stock prices or the board of directors' structure during the 
IPO. IPOs selected for the sample had to be listed in the Helsinki Stock Exchange and 
targeted at both private and institutional investors. Finally, 47 IPOs were selected for the 
final sample.  
 
Daily returns for IPOs, the market index, and the risk-free rate were collected from the 
University of Vaasa databases. The value-weighted OMXHCAP Index was used to proxy 
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the market returns since its 10% weight limitation for individual shares better illustrates 
the overall market behavior than the OMX All-Share Index. The risk-free rate used was 
the 3-month Euribor. In some IPOs, the listing firms' board of directors changed just 
when the listing began. In these cases, the board of directors sitting the day before the 
listing date was used as it can be assumed that board members who join the board the 
day a company is listed do not affect the underpricing. The empirical tests were con-
ducted using mainly two programs: Microsoft Excel and EViews, using Excel as the major 
tool and supporting the empirical tests with EViews. In empirical calculations, the divi-
dends were excluded due to their complex characteristic.   
 
 
6.2 Categorization of IPOs 
 
Number of Females Number of companies Percentage 
0 22 48,9 % 
1 15 33,3 % 
2 7 15,6 % 
3 1 2,2 % 
 
Table 3.  Number of Women across Finnish Boards during IPOs. 
 
In the empirical tests throughout this thesis, IPOs are divided into two groups based on 
board diversity. The first category includes IPO firms with no women on the board during 
the listing process (NW.) The second category includes IPO companies with at least one 
woman sitting on the board (W). The exact date used in the categorization is the one day 
before the stock starts to trade publicly.  The first category includes 22 IPOs, which covers 
48,9% of the sample. The second category consists of 23 IPOs that make 51,1% of the 
sample. A bigger sample size would have been preferred for more precise empirical re-
sults, but the small number of IPOs in the Finnish market does not make it possible. The 
IPOs would have been split into four categories in the optimal scenario, but the small 






Figure 3. IPOs included in the study categorized by gender diversity on the board. 
 
Figure 3 shows how IPOs are categorized over time. The number of IPOs with no women 
on the board is more random during the period. The number of women sitting on the 
board has been slightly increasing during the time, as seen in Figure 3. The exact listing 




This study uses two different methods to measure the abnormal underpricing of IPOs 
and the differences in performance between IPO boards having either at least one or no 
women or the board.  The first approach adjusts the first-day returns for the correspond-
ing market returns and takes place in event time. As mentioned earlier, the value-
weighted OMXHCAP Index will proxy the market returns. Because this method com-
pletely ignores the traditional measures of risk, CAPM-adjusted and two-factor adjusted 
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in this study are based on previous IPO literature, which gives a robust empirical justifi-
cation to use them.   
 
 
6.3.1 Market adjusted returns 
Abnormal initial return for the IPO is the difference between the IPO return and market 
return on a listing day. IPO returns in the percentage change between the listing price 
and first-day closing price. This method is widely used in previous IPO research to calcu-
late the first day IPO returns, and it works well in studies focusing on developed markets 
such as Ritter (1991), Purnanandam et al. (2004) and Álvarez et al. (2005). Abnormal 
initial returns are computed as follows: 
 
(5) arit = rit − rmt 
 
where rit is the return between IPO listing price and first-day closing price and rmt is the 
market return for the same day. Abnormal initial return for the security is the arit. The 
mean (Equally-weighted average) abnormal initial return is computed separately for all 
IPOs, NW IPOs and W IPOs: 
 








where ARt means the average abnormal initial return, arit is the abnormal initial return 
for security i, and n stands for the number of IPOs / assets.  
 
As the sample size in this study is remarkably small, handling outliers need to be consid-
ered. Due to the small sample size in this study, the outliers will not be excluded. How-
ever, they are included by converting them to the value of the nearest non-suspicious 
observation. This transformation is called winsorization, and it reduces the effect of 
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spurious outliers. Then, it needs to be calculated whether the ARs differ statistically from 
zero by using Student's (1908) t-test:  
 
(7)                              𝑡 =






where AR explains the average abnormal initial return, s is the standard deviation, and n 
is the number of securities. t is the Student's t-statistic. The possible statistical signifi-
cance is denoted with either *, ** or *** depending on whether the significance is 10%, 
5% or 1% level. This logic is utilized in other empirical results-tables too.  
 
Student's t-statistic requires certain assumptions to hold to be considered as a trustwor-
thy method. Firstly, the initial abnormal returns need to be normally distributed. Accord-
ing to Keloharju (1993), it is expected that in this kind of study, the results have excess 
kurtosis and are right-skewed. Secondly, the initial abnormal returns need to be inde-
pendent. Since one-day returns are used in this study, the overlapping is not a problem. 
The non-parametric Kolmogrov-Smirov test is examined in order to test whether the ARs 
are normally distributed. If its results in p-values less than 0.100, the results are consid-
ered as non-normal. Consequently, the medians are presented with the target of meas-
uring central tendency comprehensively. The null hypothesis stating that medians are 
zero is tested with Wilcoxon (1945) ranked-sum test, and p-values resulting from this test 
are shown in the results tables. The median tests are also examined similarly to the mean 
tests, based on the assumption of independence.  
 
Next, cross-sectional analysis is used to find which factors might affect abnormal initial 
returns. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is used as a regression method. Women's percent-
age on the board will be used as one of the independent variables because this study 
aims to find whether the women on the board affect the IPO underpricing. Another re-
markable variable used in this analysis is the size of the issue, which is represented by 
the IPO's gross proceeds. In order to avoid problems with non-normality, logarithmic 
51 
transformation is made for both these variables. The regression is mathematically ex-
pressed as follows:  
 
(8) ar𝑖 = αi + 𝛽1ln (Women)i + 𝛽2ln (Size)i + 𝜀i 
 
Where ar𝑖  is the abnormal initial return for security i, αi is the constant term, 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 
represents the parameter estimates for ln(Women)i and ln(Size)i, ln(Women)i is the 
natural log of security i's ratio of women on the board compared to men, ln(Size)i is the 
natural log of security i's total amount raised from an IPO and 𝜀i is the error term.  
 
Independent variables for the regression above were chosen on purpose. Earlier litera-
ture has shown strong evidence on gross proceeds affection on IPO underpricing. The 
correlation between gross proceeds and 1st day IPO returns is negative based on previous 
literature. This belief is based on Ritter's (1991) studies, where he found out that big 
issues are less speculative and the "initial size" of the IPO is a proxy for risk, so small IPOs 
need to be more underpriced. Keloharju (1993) has documented similar evidence from 
Finnish markets where a strong negative relationship between size and initial underpric-
ing has been found out, although only economically. 
 
 According to previous studies, women directors' percentage has not shown any statisti-
cal significance to IPO underpricing (Handa & Singh, 2015). Handa and Singh's result 
shows that gender diversity of the board has no significant effect on IPO's 1st-day perfor-
mance. Kaur and Singh (2015) found a negative relation between gender diversity on the 
board and IPO underpricing. As the number of women on the board increases, the un-
derpricing of IPO decreases. Hence, the women on the board can be seen as a quality 
signal reducing the IPO underpricing. However, the relation is not statistically significant. 
The studies above focus on Indian markets, which significantly differ from Finnish mar-
kets. Too strong assumptions from the studies above should not be made due to the 
difference in market behavior.  
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As the 1st-day market-adjusted returns are calculated as explained above, the time-pe-
riod in tests will be broadened to a more extended period. In this study, long-term per-
formance is measured in a one-year period. In many studies, the starting point for the 
long-term performance is the 1st-day closing price, as the first-day price movements are 
seen to be abnormal. On the other hand, some studies use the offering price as the 
starting point. Both styles will be used in this study to maximize the practical implications 
and identify the alleged movements on the IPO stock prices.  
 
A market-adjusted method to measure both long-run and short-run IPO returns was cho-
sen based on previous studies. This study will mimic Keloharju's (1993) methodology to 
use wealth relatives (WRs). This methodology is not restricted to only Finnish markets, 
as both Ritter (1991) and Álvarez et al. (2005) have used WRs to measure the market-
adjusted IPO returns. A WR greater than 1,00 can be interpreted as IPO outperforming 
the market during a set time-period. Consequently, a WR under 1,00 indicates that the 
market outperformed the IPO. In order to calculate the WRs, the holding period return 
(HPR) needs to be computed first: 
 





where HPRit is the holding period return for security i in time period t, and rit is the 
return for security i in time period t. After that, the HPR plus one is divided by one plus 
the market return  for the equivalent time period:  
 





where writ is the wealth relative for security i in time period t, HPRit is the holding pe-
riod return for security i in time period t and rmt is the market return for time period t. 
Next, equally-weighted average (mean) WRs are computed separately for each N and 
NW, and all IPOS: 
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Where WRt is the mean wealth relative in time period t, writ is the wealth relative in 
time period t for security i, and n is the number of securities in the equation.  
 
Consequently, it needs to be calculated whether the WRs differ statistically significantly 
from 1,00 by using Student's t-test:  
 
(12)                              𝑡 =






where WR explains the average wealth relative, s is the standard deviation, and n is the 
number of securities. t is the Student's t-statistic. 
 
Finally, pooled OLS regression is created to identify whether women's presence on the 
board or the IPO's size has affection on the one-year abnormal returns (1st day not in-
cluded). This cross-sectional model is very similar to the model used to calculate initial 
abnormal returns since only the response variables are different: 
 
(13) wr𝑖 = αi + 𝛽1ln (Women)i + 𝛽2ln (Size)i + 𝜀i 
 
Where wr𝑖  is the wealth relative (12 months) for security i, αi is the constant term, 𝛽1 
and 𝛽2 represents the parameter estimates for ln(Women)i and ln(Size)i, ln(Women)i 
is the natural log of security i's ratio of women on the board compared to men, ln(Size)i 
is the natural log of security i's total amount raised from an IPO and 𝜀i is the error term. 
 
Just like the relationship between women's presence on the board and the IPO 
underpricing, the relationship between women on the board and long-term IPO 
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underperformance is not extensively studied. Welbourne et al. (2007) have studied Wall 
Street's reaction to women in IPOs. They examined the relationship between gender 
diversity in top management teams and IPO performance. Their long-term performance 
results indicate that having women on the board results in higher earnings and greater 
shareholder wealth, which is explained by the increased stock price. This finding of the 
role of the Female-variable was statistically significant.  Singh et al. (2019) had similar 
results in the Indian markets.  
 
Based on previous studies, a significant positive relationship between size and long-run 
performance has been detected. Although the results have been statistically insignificant, 
Keloharju (1993), Álvarez et al. (2005) and Westerholm (2006) have found a similar 
relationship in Finnish, Spanish and Nordic markets. To conclude, both coefficients of 
independent variables are hypothesized to have positive signs in the cross-sectional 
regression. 
 
In addition to previously mentioned coefficients, t-statistics, standard errors and p-
values for independent variables, adjusted coefficient of determination and F-statistics 
are reported in the results-tables too. The first one is used to test the regression's 
significance. The latter is a goodness-of-fit measure that explains the percentage 
variation in the dependent variables explained by the regression. In other words, it 
punishes for including too many additional independent variables.  
 
 
6.3.2 Risk-Adjusted Returns 
When market-adjusted returns are used as a benchmark, an implicit assumption is that 
the IPO's beta equals one. However, the previous literature has shown that this may be 
misleading. The betas of IPOs seem to exceed one's value consistently, suggesting that 
the market-adjusted abnormal returns are upward biased. So, in this study, the beta-
adjusted performance will be examined too. The history of international IPOs shows that 
the IPOs are smaller both size and sales-wise on average than seasoned firms. These IPO 
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companies are more likely to suffer from small size risk, which needs to be considered 
when studying the aftermarket IPO performance. Hence, the 2-factor adjusted method 
will be used. Monthly returns are used to minimize the effect of non-synchronous trad-
ing.  
 
Another flaw that needs to be taken into account is the overlapping of IPO return periods. 
Thus, the mean and median tests' independence assumption does not hold, leading to 
overvalued statistical significance. The solution for this is the rolling portfolios, as they 
control the problems of event-clustering and cross-sectional correlation. These portfo-
lios are constructed as follows: each IPO is placed in either of two portfolios, whether 
they have women on the board or not. In addition to that, IPOs are included in one port-
folio, which has all IPOs in it. Each IPO is held from a month to next year’s same month, 
starting the first calendar month after the IPO. At the end of the holding period, the IPO 
is dropped out of the portfolio.  
 
After all, IPOs are divided into portfolios as mentioned above, time-series regressions 
are run for the equally weighted monthly portfolios (all, women, and no women) in long-
run, starting with the basic one-factor CAPM: 
 
(14)  rpt − rft = αp + 𝛽p(rmt − rft) + 𝜀p 
 
where rpt is the monthly portfolio return, rft is the risk-free rate, αp is the abnormal re-
turn on the portfolio, 𝛽p  is the beta coefficient of the portfolio, rmt  is the market's 
monthly return and 𝜀p is the error term.  
 
It is worth mentioning that since IPOs have no earlier returns, parameter estimates can-
not be estimated from them. Instead, the calendar-time methodology of Espenlaub et 
al. (2000), Brav et al. (2000) and Purnanandam et al. (2004) will be mimicked in this study. 
Besides, instead of calculating betas for each IPO using the market model, the betas will 
be computed jointly on a portfolio-wide level. By doing that, the effect of thin trading 
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will be lowered, as it is a prevalent issue on IPOs. Using individual betas for IPOs does 
not seem rational.  
 
In addition to the results that CAPM gives about IPOs performance compared to sea-
soned stocks, it gives parameter estimates of beta coefficients that are crucial to com-
pute the beta-adjusted alphas. To calculate the beta-adjusted alphas for each portfolio, 
corresponding fixed beta derived from CAPM is used for every calendar month by reor-
ganizing the Formula 14 above: 
 
(15)  αp = rpt − [rft + 𝛽p(rmt − rft)] 
 
The formula above is also known as Jensen's (1967) alpha, which is used very widely to 
measure risk-adjusted performances. Next, the 2-factor model is regressed just like the 
CAPM, with just one additional factor, size: 
 
(16) rpt − rft = αp + 𝛽p(rmt − rft) + 𝜑pSMBt + 𝜀p 
 
Where in addition to the CAPM factors,  𝜑p is the factor loading on SMBt  (the monthly 
size factor. Once the loading factors are figured, they are used to determine the alphas 
for all, women, and no women portfolios, similarly to Formula 14: 
 
(17) αp = rpt − [rft + 𝛽p(rmt − rft) + 𝜑pSMBt] 
 
To study the statistical properties of the above-calculated CAPM and 2-factor adjusted 
alphas, the same methodology will be used that was used in the market-adjusted, event-
time framework. So, Formulas 6 and 7 are applied, and similar normality and median 





As with all empirical studies, there are always some limitations. In this study, the first 
one is the small sample size. As the Finnish market is relatively small, there are not many 
IPOs per decade. This means that even though some economic significance may be 
found, it is most likely not statistically significant. The small number of observations 
might cause high standard deviations, leading to a larger standard error. 
 
Another limitation is the ignorance of dividends. Due to their problematic characteristics 
in returns, they are challenging to take into account. The ignorance of dividends can have 
an impact, especially on long-run performance. Quite likely, both groups, IPOs with and 
without women on the board, suffer similarly from this ignorance, but the small sample 
size may drift the effect more beneficial to one group.  
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7 Empirical results 
This chapter describes the empirical results of this study. The results are obtained with 
the methodology which was presented in the previous chapter. During this chapter, the 
results are shown separately for all IPOs, IPOs with at least one woman sitting on the 
board during the listing process and IPOs with no women on the board. The first category 
is presented as “All,” second as “Women,” and third as “No women.” In the first subchap-
ter, descriptive statistics will be introduced. After that, short- and long-run results are 
discussed separately. Short-run results are obtained with market-adjusted returns, while 
long-run tests are examined with both market- and risk-adjusted methods. 
 
 
7.1 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics of the number of women on the board are illustrated in Table 4. 
Results are presented as a ratio of women on the board compared to all board members. 
The whole sample is divided into just about half, as the “Women”-category has 23 IPOs 
compared to the “No Women”-category’s 22 IPOs.  Not surprisingly, looking at the his-
torical data, the average percentage of women sitting on the board is relatively low, as it 
is only 13%.  Finnish IPOs average fewer women sitting on the board than Finnish publicly 
traded companies (European Institute of Gender Equality, 2019). However, the numbers 
are quite high from an international perspective while looking at IPO companies’ num-
bers, as we saw in this paper's theoretical part. The percentage of women on the board 
in the “Women”-category differs from 13% to 43%. No IPO company had more women 
than men sitting on the board. 
 
  Mean Median Max. Min. Std. N 
All 0,13 0,13 0,43 0,00 13,67 % 45 
Women 0,24 0,20 0,43 0,13 8,21 % 23 
No women 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 % 22 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics on women on the board. 
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Next, in Table 5, we have statistics about the size, more precisely about gross proceeds 
of the individual IPOs. IPOs in Finland are relatively small compared to larger markets, 
such as the United States or the UK, averaging 56,11m€ gross proceeds while looking at 
all IPOs. The standard deviation is relatively high in all three categories, as the difference 
between minimum and maximum is big. The “Women”-the category includes IPOs with 
higher gross proceeds, as the maximum of “No women”-category is only 169,63m€ com-
pared to “Women’s” 169,93m€. Overall, it can be seen that “Women” IPOs are much 
more extensive compared to “No women” IPOs. Finnish IPOs have grown a lot since the 
late 1980s, as Keloharju (1993) documented a mean of 11,33m€. The high standard de-
viation of 173,63% in the “Women”-category causes difficulties while making conclu-
sions from this table.  
    
m€ Mean Median Max. Min. Std. N 
All 56,11 15,32 762,19 1,55 129 % 45 
Women 82,06 17,94 762,19 1,55 173,63 % 23 
No women 28,98 12,57 169,63 2,05 44,27 % 22 
 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics on size (gross proceeds).  
 
Table 6 includes characteristics of Finnish IPOs’ offer prices. As seen from the table, there 
is not much difference between different categories’ IPO prices.  “No women”-category 
averages slightly higher numbers, mainly because it has more IPOs in the higher-end and 
fewer IPOs in the lower end. So-called penny stocks, trading below 1€ per share, are 
often affiliated with more radical proportional price changes than stocks with higher 
prices. Luckily, the “Women”-the category has only one IPO of listing price under 1€, so 
it will not cause a problem in later parts of the empirical research. 
    
€ Mean Median Max. Min. Std. N 
All 7,57 6,35 33,00 0,65 52,50 % 45 
Women 6,10 5,90 11,50 0,65 25,99 % 23 
No women 9,11 7,18 33,00 4,20 67,69 % 22 
 
Table 6. Descriptive statistics on the offer price. 
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7.2 Short-run performance 
This chapter provides empirical results on the short-run performance of Finnish IPOs. 
Differences between IPOs with and without women sitting on the board will be pre-
sented. In addition, the performance of all Finnish IPOs is studied. Market-adjusted 
methods are used to examine the test. 
 
Initial abnormal results, so-called ARs are presented in table 7. As can be assumed from 
previous evidence, Finnish IPOs have been significantly underpriced during the time-pe-
riod 2013-2018. However, the power of the underpricing-phenomenon has weakened, 
as the mean (median) abnormal return for the “All”-category is 5,11% (4,11)%. Keloharju 
(1993) obtained initial abnormal returns of nearly 9% in a sample of 1980s IPOs. Even 
though the underpricing for all IPOs is still statistically significant, the effect is not as 
strong as it used to be. This is a remarkable finding, as Finnish IPOs have not been studied 
much after the financial crisis. One critical factor explaining the weakened phenomenon 
is the most recent financial crisis. IPOs post-crisis has gained a lot smaller initial abnormal 
returns than IPOs pre-crisis (Li et al., 2018). A high deviation of IPO pricing might be 
caused by the complexity of the valuation process of IPOs.  
 
AR     All W NW W-NW 
Mean   5,11 %*** 4,97 %** 5,26 %** -0,29 % 
Conventional t-statistic  2,631 1,817 1,862 -0,108 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov  0,090 0,116 0,122 0,522 
Conventional p-value  0,006 0,041 0,038 0,458 
Median   4,11 % 3,49 % 4,14 % -0,65 % 
Max.   45,36 % 29,65 % 45,36 %  
Min.   -21,29 % -21,29 % -20,68 %  
Std.   13,03 % 13,11 % 13,25 %  
N     45 23 22  
 
Table 7. Initial abnormal returns, so-called ARs. 
 
Both “Women”- and “No Women”-categories have statistically significant mean of 4,97% 
and 5,25% at the 5% level of significance in initial abnormal returns. Even though the 
“Women”-category has a slightly smaller mean, straight conclusions cannot be made as 
the difference is minimal. From the companies’ perspective, it cannot be directly 
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assumed that women act as a “quality signal” that reduces the underpricing. Hence, the 
first hypothesis stating that the greater female board presence reduces the IPO's under-
pricing cannot be accepted yet. These results are in line with the few previous papers 
that have studied the relation between IPO underpricing and women on the board 
(Handa & Singh, 2015). Both groups have nearly identical standard deviations, so there 
is basically no difference in the difficulty of valuating these IPOs. Overall, the “No 
women”-category has performed slightly better in all tests from the company’s perspec-
tive. Average, median and maximum are higher, and minimum lower compared to 
“Women”-category. The median and mean difference is shown in the “W-NW”-column, 
and it is relatively small. 
 
Table 8 shows regression results with initial abnormal results as the dependent variable. 
As seen from the coefficients, the women on the board’s affection for the underpricing 
is shallow. Hence, it seems clear that the gender diversity of a company’s board does not 
affect the IPO's underpricing.  As for the size, another control variable, it seems not to 
have any impact on initial abnormal returns. However, in contrast to previous studies, 
the sign of its coefficient is opposite (Ritter, 1991). However, as the p-value is as high as 
0,383, it cannot be stated that there is a positive relationship between abnormal initial 
returns and the IPOs size. The possibility for a mistake by making such as statement is 
38,28%.  
 
AR Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value N 
Intercept -0,1612 0,2434 -0,6625 0,5113  
Women on the board 0,0032 0,0259 0,1231 0,9026  
Size 0,0128 0,0146 0,8821 0,3828   
Regression         45 
 
Table 8. Regression results with AR’s as the dependent variable. 
 
Overall, as the effect of the women on the boardroom in IPO companies have been ex-
tensively analyzed by going through the empirical evidence in Tables 7 and 8, there is no 
other choice than reject the first hypothesis stating that the greater female board 
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presence reduces the underpricing of the IPO. While IPOs were clearly underpriced, 
there was no evidence towards either of the categories, “Women” or “No women,” to 
be more underpriced. However, few implications of the first-day performance can be 
made regarding the first-day returns of IPOs. First, on average, IPOs give owners great 
returns on a one-day time-period. Second, the volume of the underpricing has reduced 
since the financial crisis. Another motive reducing the volume of the underpricing phe-
nomenon is the awareness about it. Financial anomalies tend to lose power or even 
completely disappear when they get well-known. 
 
 
7.3 Long-run performance 
This chapter examines whether IPOs having women on the board perform better than 
IPOs having no women in the boardroom in the long-run, or vice versa. As in the previous 
chapter, the performance of all IPOs is included in the analysis too. The first subchapter 
explains the market-adjusted results, and the second focuses on risk-adjusted results us-
ing CAPM and 2-factor corrections. 
 
 
7.3.1 Market-Adjusted returns 
Table 9 presents market-adjusted IPO performance one-year after the IPO launch with 
wealth relatives, so-called WRs. First, the table shows that the abnormal initial returns 
make an enormous difference in the stock’s one-year performance. While the WR for 
“All” is 1,101 when first-day returns are taken into calculations, it is just 1,035 when ab-
normal initial returns are excluded. The same logic applies to the other two categories 
as well, where the gap between WRs is 0,07 for “Women” and 0,062 for “No Women.” 
The only statistically significant result is the “All”-category’s mean, while first-day returns 
are included, which is statistically significant at the 10% level. Overall, even though there 
is not much statistical significance, IPOs offer a great value investment-wise when invest-
ing in them for a one-year period. They beat the market on average, even without the 
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first-day returns. However, even though the mean WRs for all three categories are over 
1,00 when first-day returns are excluded (1,035, 1,046 and 1,024), medians for “All”- and 
“Women”-categories fall slightly under 1,00 (0,969 and 0,955). 
 
WR12     All W NW W-NW 
 Mean   1,101* 1,116 1,086 0,030 
Conventional t-statistic  1,435 1,200 0,815 -0,423 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov  0,084 0,079 0,160 0,151 
Conventional p-value  0,079 0,121 0,212 0,338 
Median   1,078 1,006 1,082 -0,076 
Max.   2,729 1,994 2,729  
Min.   0,367 0,367 0,466  
Std.   47,22 % 46,23 % 49,26 %  
N     45 23 22  
       
WR12 first day excluded   All W NW W-NW 
Mean   1,035 1,046 1,024 0,022 
Conventional t-statistic  0,592 0,598 0,256 -0,223 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov  0,097 0,111 0,165 0,072 
Conventional p-value  0,278 0,278 0,400 0,413 
Median   0,969 0,955 1,007 -0,053 
Max.   2,500 1,734 2,500  
Min.   0,372 0,372 0,456  
Std.   39,39 % 36,50 % 43,04 %  
N     45 23 22  
 
Table 9. Wealth relatives (WRs) 12 months after the IPO launch. 
 
Next, differences between “Women” and “No women”-categories’ WRs will be de-
scribed. There are no significant differences in groups’ performances, even though the 
“Women”-category has a higher mean no matter if the first-day returns are included or 
excluded. However, it has slightly smaller median in both situations, which is mostly be-
cause of its lower minimum (0,367 vs 0,466 and 0,372 vs 0,456) and maximum (1,994 vs 
2,729 and 1,734 vs 2,500). This table's last clear finding is that being a subscriber instead 
of an early aftermarket buyer would be preferable since all groups performed better 
when first-day returns were included.  
 
Table 10 presents the findings from the cross-sectional analysis, where the one-year WRs 
is the dependent variable. The coefficient of “Women on the board is negative,” indicat-
ing that women sitting on the board negatively affects to company’s stock performance 
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in a one-year period. On the other hand, women sitting on the board could be seen as a 
“quality signal” that reduces the underpricing, which is excellent from a company’s per-
spective. After all, by having p-values over 10% in all samples, comprehensive conclu-
sions cannot be made by the long-run WR abnormal return analysis. 
 
The next regressor, size, is positive. This is a slight surprise, as it suggests that the best 
investments for a year-period would be large-cap IPOs having no women sitting on the 
board. However, as with the first regressor, the problematic sample causes this to have 
no statistically significant effects.  
 
WR12 Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value N 
Intercept 0,6206 0,8871 0,6997 0,4880  
Women on the board -0,0093 0,0944 -0,0986 0,9219  
Size 0,0283 0,0530 0,5336 0,5964   
Regression         45 
 
Table 10. Regression results with WR’s as the dependent variable. 
 
 
7.3.2 Risk-Adjusted Returns 
In Table 11, risk-adjusted returns in long-run performance are presented in one-year 
CAPM regressions on rolling, calendar-time IPO portfolios. The first observation is the 
relatively low beta coefficients. Previous literature suggests that IPO betas are over 1,00, 
indicating higher than average systematic risk. This study's sample offers different results, 
as beta coefficients for three different groups are 0,264, 0,270 and 0,545. A few different 
factors are explaining the difference. The first factor is the characteristics of IPOs, mainly 
Finnish IPOs. Preliminary analysis showed that many of the IPOs had eve a negative beta, 
and for many others, they were under 0,10. This pushes the portfolio’s beta coefficient 
down.  
 
Second, the sample size is very small, which increases the probability of having extreme 
values. Based on these beta coefficients, IPOs having no women on the board are more 
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defensive than IPOs with women on the board. Finally, the statistically insignificant al-
phas give evidence that the generally thought poor long-run performance of IPOs is not 
a distinct phenomenon in the Finnish market. In fact, the alphas are even positive, mean-
ing that the Finnish IPOs seem to beat the market in a one-year time period. 
 
CAPM   𝒂𝑷 𝜷𝝆 N R-square 
All  0,0081 0,2644 78 0,0414 
  (1,4502) (1,8103)*   
 
Women  0,0098 0,2703 60 0,0246 
  (1,1307) (1,1829)   
 
No women  0,0056 0,5453 78 0,1231 
    (0,8748) (3,2669)**     
 
Table 11. One-year CAPM regressions on rolling, calendar-time IPO portfolios. 
 
In Table 12, one-year CAPM-adjusted alphas are presented for each group. They are ad-
justed with beta coefficients from Table 11. Means for “All” (0,81%) and “Women” 
(1,13%) are statistically significant at the level of 10%. The “No women” group performed 
slightly weaker, having a mean of 0,56%. In addition to one-year CAPM regressions, these 
CAPM-adjusted alphas give evidence that Finnish IPOs actually beat the market in a one-
year period with statistically significant results. Median alpha for the “All”-category is 
positive too (0,80%).  
 
During a one-year time-period, IPO companies having at least one woman on the board 
performed slightly better than IPO companies with no women on the board (1,13% vs. 
0,56%). Even though the difference is slight, it is obvious and in line with previous litera-
ture from India, where an extended analysis on the topic of IPOs with women on boards 
reveals that that greater percentage of female representation leads to lower long-run 
underperformance (Ahmad-Zaluki, 2012). This means that in longer time-periods, for ex-
ample, one year, the women on the board can be seen as “quality signals” that positively 
affect a company’s performance.  
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In addition, the “Women”-group performed better compared to “No women” group in 
all categories, having higher median (0,42% vs 0,11%), maximum (27,39% vs 20,90%) 
and minimum (-10,81% vs 13,87%). It also confirms that the possible premium of having 
women on the board cannot be explained by coefficients such as beta, as they are taken 
into calculations in Table 12. This all supports the second research hypothesis that states 
that IPOs with greater female board presence outperform the IPOs with lower female 
board presence in a one-year period. However, it cannot be accepted yet, as the statisti-
cal evidence is not strong enough. 
 
CAPM-adjusted alphas All W NW 
Mean 0,81 %* 1,13 %* 0,56 % 
Conventional t-statistic 1,493 1,325 0,901 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 0,0820 0,120 0,090 
Conventional p-value 0,070 0,095 0,185 
Median 0,80 % 0,42 % 0,11 % 
Max. 17,49 % 27,39 % 20,90 % 
Min. -10,63 % -10,81 % -13,87 % 
Std. 4,79 % 6,63 % 5,48 % 
N 78 60 78 
 
Table 12. One-year CAPM-adjusted alphas. 
 
Table 13 offers parameter estimates from the one-year two-factor regressions. The re-
sults are consistent with earlier results from CAPM regressions. Consistent with the em-
pirically motivated expectations, the SMB factor loading is significantly positive for all 
groups. It is statistically significant at the 1% level for “All” (0,632) and “No women” 
(0,549) and significant at the level of 5% for “Women” (0,600). Hence, it is clear that the 
Finnish IPOs are exposed to relatively high small size risk. Both of the “Women” and “No 
women” groups contribute to this phenomenon, as both of their values are clearly pos-
itive. Besides, the SMB factor seems to be a justifiable addition to the regression model, 







2-factor   𝒂𝑷 𝜷𝝆 𝝋𝑷 N R-square 
All  0,0039 0,4467 0,6319 78 0,2080 
  (0,7408) (3,1612)*** (3,9695)***   
 
Women  0,0069 0,3052 0,6006 60 0,1070 
  (0,8155) (1,3819) (2,3130)**   
 
No women  0,0019 0,7036 0,5487 78 0,2110 
    (0,3067) (4,1747)*** (2,8898)***     
 
Table 13. One-year 2-factor regressions on rolling, calendar-time IPO portfolios. 
 
Consistently with one-year CAPM regressions, the 2-factor regression results with posi-
tive alpha for all three groups. This is against the well-known anomaly that IPOs under-
perform in the long-term (Keloharju, 1993). According to this empirical study, this is not 
the case with this sample of Finnish IPOs. IPOs in this study seem to beat their non-IPO 
counterparts, but not statistically significantly. Once again, the “Women”-category 
gained higher alpha compared to the “No women”-category (0,0069 vs. 0,0019). This 
strengthens the finding considering the second research hypothesis that IPOs with 
women on the board outperform their counterparts in the long-term in the Finnish mar-
ket. However, the difference is not statistically significant.   
 
Table 14 offers long-run alphas with two-factor adjustments. As expected from Table 12, 
all the alphas are lower than the CAPM-adjustments due to the SMB-factor. The statisti-
cal significance from Table 12 is gone, and one of the groups has even a negative sign. 
However, the mean for the “All”-category is still positive (0,213%), as well as the median 
(0,056%). For the other two groups, the addition of the SMB-factor pushes the medians 
below zero. Nevertheless, their means stay positive. Overall, looking at the whole sample 
in the “All”-group, it seems like the Finnish IPOs do not underperform compared to the 
market in a one-year time period. This, too, supports the belief created by this study and 
its evidence that the Finnish IPOs do not underperform the market in a one-year time 
period. Also, the size risk seems to have quite the same effect on all three groups, mean-
ing that having women on the board does not reduce the exposure for the size risk.  
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2-factor adjusted alphas All W NW 
Mean 0,213 % 0,509 % -0,022 % 
Conventional t-statistic 0,413 0,612 -0,036 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 0,087 0,148 0,083 
Conventional p-value 0,340 0,271 0,486 
Median 0,056 % -0,309 % -0,449 % 
Max. 12,12 % 21,82 % 20,23 % 
Min. -10,88 % -13,41 % -11,31 % 
Std. 4,56 % 6,44 % 5,45 % 
N 78 60 78 
 
Table 14. One-year 2-factor adjusted alphas. 
 
Finally, differences between “Women”- and “No women”-groups are considered when 
using the long-run alphas with two-factor adjustments to understand whether they per-
form differently. The results are quite in line with the previous CAPM regressions. 
“Women”-group outperforms the “No women”-group, both mean and median wise 
(0,509% vs -0,022% and -0,309% vs -0,449%). Even though there is no statistical signifi-
cance in either group’s performance while using the two-factor adjusted alphas, the dif-
ference between the means is large. Hence, it further strengthens the second research 
hypothesis's acceptance, stating that IPOs with diverse boards outperform the IPOs with 
no women on the board. Overall, the long-term risk-adjusted regressions and alphas 
show investors that there is no need to avoid investing in Finnish IPOs in the long-term, 





Investors are always trying to find ways to create excess returns. During the past few 
years, one of the hot topics has been the Initial Public offerings, as the IPO underpricing 
phenomenon has become very popular in behavioral finance. On the other hand, IPOs 
are well known for their relatively bad long-term performance (Ritter, 1991). The IPO 
market has been overheated in a way where investors try to subscribe to as many stocks 
as possible, and after the possible initial returns, they dump the stocks back to the mar-
ket.  
 
This study aims to find empirical evidence from Finnish IPOs between 2013 and 2018 for 
both of the anomalies mentioned above, adding in one trendy factor: gender diversity. 
The objective of the study is to investigate whether IPO companies having women on 
the board perform differently, or more precisely better, both short- and long-term. Basi-
cally, the primary purpose is to empirically test whether the women on the board de-
crease short-term underpricing and long-term underperformance. The study considers 
underpricing from a company’s perspective when the underpricing is not seen as a good 
thing as investors see it. From a company’s perspective, the valuation should be as pre-
cise as possible, meaning that the stock’s price does not move massively on the first 
trading day. Investors want, of course, the stock to rocket as much as possible during the 
first day, assuming that they have subscribed to it.  
 
This study's sample consists of 45 IPOs, all listed to Finnish markets between 2013 and 
2018. The IPO data is collected from companies listing prospectuses and from the Thom-
son Reuters database. The IPOs are divided into two groups, depending on whether the 
companies had women sitting on the board during the listing process or not. After doing 
the procedure mentioned above, the sample has two groups: “Women,” including 23 
IPOs and “No women,” including 22 IPOs. OMX Helsinki Cap is used as the market bench-
mark, and 3-month Euribor is used as a risk-free rate. 
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The study's first hypothesis suggests that women sitting on the IPO company’s board 
reduces the underpricing. A few market-adjusted research methods are used to find ev-
idence to either accept or reject the first hypothesis. Based on the empirical findings in 
this study, the first hypothesis is entirely rejected. Even though the mean and median 
underpricing is somewhat smaller for IPOs with a diverse board, the connection found is 
only a weak tendency. There is no statistical significance in the difference. Although 
women can be seen as a “quality signal” from the company’s perspective as they reduce 
the underpricing, the volume in the difference is not big enough to conclude it. None-
theless, both categories and consequently all IPOs from the sample are statistically sig-
nificantly underpriced, suggesting that subscribing to the IPOs is still a viable way to gain 
excess returns. 
 
However, the empirical studies reveal that the underpricing in Finnish markets has im-
paired during the last decades, as it has fallen from 8,7% in Keloharju’s (1993) studies to 
5,11% found in this study. A few factors can well explain the change. First, studies from 
other markets show that the underpricing has drastically weakened after the 2010 finan-
cial crisis. Second, the underpricing anomaly has gained popularity, which is proven to 
weaken the intensity of any phenomenon in behavioral finance. Finally, another variable 
studied in the first regression, size, has no connection to the level of the first day returns.  
 
The second research hypothesis of this study, which states that IPOs with greater female 
board presence outperform the IPOs with lower female board presence in a one-year 
period, is tested with both risk- and market-adjusted methods. The market-adjusted ab-
normal returns are computed for both groups and for all IPOs, with and without the first-
day returns, to achieve the most comprehensive results. In addition, cross-sectional re-
gressions are examined. Interestingly, the Finnish IPOs from the sample performed quite 
much better than expected from the previous studies. As known, IPOs tend to underper-
form in the long-run, but this study offers relatively different outcomes when it comes 
to long-run performance. As for all IPOs, the market-adjusted returns are clearly positive 
no matter whether the first trading day is taken into account or not. In addition, the 
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group consisting of IPOs having at least one woman sitting on the board performed 
slightly better compared to its counterpart giving support to the second research hy-
pothesis. 
 
Risk-adjusted returns follow the same pattern as market-adjusted returns. All three  
groups achieve positive alpha, yet the "Women"-group performs best. Hence, this again 
strengthens the belief achieved from previous tests that IPOs having at least one woman 
on the board perform slightly better than other IPOs in the long-term. While looking at 
the betas, IPOs having no women on the board are more defensive than IPOs with 
women on the board. This supports the modern belief that men are actually more risk-
averse compared to women (Sila et al., 2015). Once again, while the IPOs with gender-
diverse boards earn higher and even statistically significant alphas than their counterpart, 
the difference between the groups is relatively small (1,13% vs. 0,56%). Even though the 
difference is close to being statistically significant at the 10% level, due to limitations, it 
is not. Two-factor regressions continue along the same path, as again "Women"-category 
beats the "No women"-category with higher alpha in a one-year period. Actually, the 
difference in mean here is the most precise and most significant (0,509% vs. -0,022%), 
supporting the second research hypothesis. However, as the results lack statistical sig-
nificance, the second research hypothesis needs to be rejected too.  
 
Nonetheless, the results of this study need to be critically reviewed as this study has its 
limitations. First of all, the research sample size is relatively narrow, consisting of only 45 
IPOs. However, there is not much to do about it as the Finnish market offers very few 
IPOs due to its small size. This negatively affects the regressions and their explanation 
degrees. Luckily, the listing boom has increased the number of IPOs during the last few 
years, improving the sample quality and quantity for future research. In addition, the 
data lack dividends because of their complex characteristics. This weakens at least the 
long-term performance of the IPOs. It can be expected that the IPOs would have per-
formed even better in the long-term if the dividends could have been added to the data. 
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However, this is pure speculation, and the absence of dividends should not significantly 
affect the differences between different groups’ results. 
 
Furthermore, it is crucial to observe how this study’s empirical results align with previous 
literature. First, the empirical findings strongly support the existence and behavioral ex-
planations on the existence of IPO underpricing. It is still statistically significant in Finnish 
markets, even though the phenomenon's volume has decreased since the last financial 
crisis. Still, the underpricing is very comprehensively present. The most common reasons 
explaining the underpricing in the previous empirical studies have been the underesti-
mation of the demand, a will to boost the demand and even a deliberate underpricing. 
Next, mirroring the previous empirical work, this study offers contradictory results re-
garding the long-term underperformance of IPOs. While IPOs are well known for their 
relatively bad long-run performance compared to the benchmark indexes, this study de-
clines this argument in a one-year period with Finnish IPOs. Even though the Finnish 
sample did not create any massive excess returns during the one-year period, the sign 
describing the long-term performance in most scenarios is positive. This refers to the 
fact that IPOs in Finland might have started to perform better fundamentally during their 
early stage. However, this study uses a one-year time-period to describe the long-term 
performance, which is a relatively short length compared to certain other studies’ time-
periods. Nonetheless, based on previous studies, the underperformance has been sig-
nificant even in a one-year period, making this finding viable and interesting.  
 
To conclude, it is essential to discuss how this study’s findings could motivate further 
research. First, the significantly good one-year performance of Finnish IPOs could be re-
searched more precisely and with more time-periods. Time-period of 24 and 36 months 
could be used to confirm the good long-term performance of Finnish IPOs. It may be a 
great idea to include Scandinavian IPOs to gain some Nordic evidence in the empirical 
research. As mentioned previously in this study, the underpricing of IPOs has significantly 
reduced since the latest financial crisis. There is a strong demand for a paper, which em-
pirically testes the IPO underpricing with Finnish IPOs, comparing two time sets: the first 
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set consisting of IPOs pre-crisis and the second consisting of IPOs post-crisis. Based on 
this study’s findings, there is an excellent opportunity to find a statistically significant 
difference in these two sets' underpricing.  
 
When it comes to gender diversity, there is undoubtedly an outstanding possibility to 
bring forth this study’s research problems. As this study faces most of its problems with 
the sample and its size, it could be modified to get more statistically significant results. 
The IPOs could be collected from a more extended period, and Nordic markets could be 
used instead of the Finnish market. However, this would not guarantee better results. It 
would be good to have more evidence on the relation between IPOs performance, both 
short- and long-term and the board’s gender diversity. Unfortunately, this relationship is 
researched very little in all markets, but the number of papers can be expected to grow 
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